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This thesis examines whether the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (‘LRA’) 
justifiably limits the constitutional right to employees to freedom of assembly 
in accordance with s36(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (‘the Constitution’). This question is considered in two broad parts.  
The first part demonstrates two limitations. First, the inability of s77 of the LRA 
to provide legislative protection to employees who wish to embark on socio-
economic protest action over a purely political issue. Second, the LRA’s 
prohibition on off-duty employees utilising the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
205 of 1993 (‘RGA’) to demonstrate against their employer over a dispute of 
mutual interest. While no court has yet considered if the LRA prohibits purely 
political protest action, the Labour Appeal Court in ADT Security v NASUWU 
2015 (36) ILJ 152 (LAC) (‘ADT Security’) held that is unlawful for off-duty 
employees to demonstrate over a dispute of mutual interest under the RGA. 
The first part begins by establishing how the LRA’s statutory definition of 
protest action cannot, in its current form, protect purely political protest and 
how this limits the constitutional right of employees to free assembly. Similarly, 
it explains how ADT Security clearly establishes that the LRA limits the 
constitutional right of employees to freedom of assembly by infringing their 
constitutional right to assemble and demonstrate in compliance with the RGA. 
The second part tests both limitations against s36(1) of the Constitution, the 
limitation clause, to assess if either infringement justifiably limits the 
constitutional right of employees to freedom of assembly, enshrined in s17 of 
the Bill of Rights. Considering the factors in s36(1)(a)-(e) of the Constitution, 
and other relevant factors, it examines if the purpose and reasons for either 
limitation are sufficiently compelling so as to be reasonable and justifiable. It 
concludes by arguing both limitations unjustifiably limit the constitutional right 
of employees to free assembly. Two recommendations are made. First, that 
the LRA be amended to expressly permit employees to demonstrate over 
disputes of mutual interest, in compliance with the RGA, in certain 
circumstances. Second, that the LRA be amended to expressly permit purely 
political protest action, provided the protest action is limited in scope and 
duration and subject to oversight by the Labour Court.  
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CHAPTER ONE    
INTRODUCTION      
1.1. BACKGROUND  
Section 17 of the Constitution1 protects the right of workers2 to demonstrate, 
assemble and picket peacefully and unarmed.3 One implication of enshrining 
freedom of assembly as a justiciable fundamental right, in a supreme 
Constitution,4 is that any law which infringes (‘or limits’)5 its exercise will be 
legally valid only if the infringement complies with the ‘general limitation 
clause’,6 contained in s36(1) of the Constitution.7 
 Because constitutional rights are often framed in broad terms, their 
content is - for the most part and generally speaking - primarily given effect to 
through legislation enacted by the legislative branch of government.8 The 
Regulation of Gatherings Act9 (‘RGA’) is the principal statute that purports to 
give effect to s17 of the Bill of Rights in practice.10 However, in the labour 
sphere, the Labour Relations Act11 (‘LRA’), which principally gives effect to the  
 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Hereafter, referred to as ‘the Constitution’.  
2 The phrase ‘worker’ and ‘employee’ is used interchangeably throughout this thesis. On the 
meaning of ‘worker’, as used in s23 of the Constitution, see SANDU v Minister of Defence 
1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) para 19-22.   
3 Hereafter referred to as ‘freedom of assembly’.  
4 Section 2 of the Constitution. For an overview of constitutional supremacy and the Bill of 
Rights, see E Mureinik ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 
SAJHR 31 and Frank Michelman ‘The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the 
Constitution’ in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 
ed (2013) 11:34.   
5 Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) at 151 explain 
”limitation” is a synonym for “infringement”. I use similar terminology throughout this thesis. 
6 Ibid at 152 further explain that s36(1) is a general limitation clause because it provides that 
‘all rights are limitable, and all are limitable according to the same set of criteria’.  
7 Section 36(1) provides that a right may only be limited if it takes place in terms of a law of 
general application and is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom after considering all relevant factors. For a high-level 
summary see Brummer v Minister of Social Development 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC) para 59.  
8 See Halton Cheadle ‘Constitutionalising the Right to Strike’ in Bob Hepple, Silvana Sciarra 
& Rochelle Le Roux (eds) Laws Against Strikes: The South African Experience in an 
International and Comparative Perspective (2016) 51-52.  
9 Act 205 of 1993. Referred to hereafter as ‘the RGA’ throughout the thesis.  
10 See Mlungwana v S 2019 (1) BCLR 88 (CC) para 7. 
11 Act 66 of 1995. Referred to hereafter as ‘the LRA’ throughout the thesis.  
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labour rights in s23 of the Constitution,12 equally gives effect to freedom of 
assembly by providing for protected ‘socio-economic protest action’13 and 
‘picketing’.14 No court has yet examined if the LRA permits employees to 
protest in terms of s77 of the LRA over a ‘purely political’ issue. Most 
academics however hold the view that the LRA does not permit purely political 
protest action, also referred to as ‘purely political strike action’.15 In ADT 
Security v NASUWU however, the Labour Appeal Court (‘LAC’) interdicted off-
duty employees from gathering under the RGA, over a dispute of mutual 
interest with their employer, despite the fact they fully complied with the RGA.16 
In doing so, the LAC implicitly concluded that the LRA limits the constitutional 
right of employees to exercise their constitutional right to demonstrate and 
assemble in compliance with the RGA.17 Equally, for reasons I later 
demonstrate, the statutory definition of protest action does not encompass 
purely political protests hence limiting the right of employees to free assembly.  
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Against this background, I consider two questions. First, how, and to what 
extent, does the LRA limit the constitutional right of employees to free  
assembly?18 Second, can either limitation be justified as a permissible  
infringement of s17 of the Bill of Rights according to the criteria contained in 
the general limitation clause in s36(1) of the Constitution?  
1.3. THESIS STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE  
The body of the thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter two discusses the 
constitutional framework. First, I outline the two-stage limitation analysis in 
 
12 Section 1(a) of the LRA states that one of it’s fundamental objects is ‘to give effect to and 
regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution’. See further 
NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 15.  
13 Section 77.   
14 Section 69.  
15 See Rehana Cassim ‘The Legal Status of Political Protest Acton under the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995’ (2008) 29 ILJ 2359.  
16 ADT Security (Pty) Ltd v NASUWU 2015 (36) ILJ 152 (LAC). 
17 Emma Fergus ‘Pickets, socio-economic protest action, gatherings and demonstrations’ in 
Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 151.   
18 A further limitation one could consider is the fact that both s69(1) and s77(1) of the LRA 
state that only ‘registered trade unions’ can initiate protected picketing or protest action. Both 
limitations however fall beyond the scope of the thesis. 
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terms of s36(1) of the Constitution. Second, I discuss several principles of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation one must apply to determine if 
legislation limits a constitutional right. Finally, I discuss the content of the 
constitutional right to freedom of assembly and provide a normative account 
of what the right should protect, both generally and in the labour law sphere.  
 Chapter three considers how the LRA and RGA  respectively regulate 
the constitutional right to freedom of assembly in practice. First, I discuss the 
historical origins and context of protest action by workers in South Africa. 
Second, I outline the substantive and procedural requirements for protected 
socio-economic protest action in terms of s77 of the LRA. Here, I illustrate why 
the statutory definition of ‘protest action’ in s213 of the LRA cannot protect 
purely political protest action and how this limits the constitutional right of 
employees to demonstrate and assemble. Third, I explain how the RGA 
regulates public assemblies and demonstrations generally and discuss how it 
imposes drastic restrictions upon the exercise this constitutional right.19   
Chapter four unpacks and critically discusses ADT Security. It aims to 
achieve three things. First, to juxtapose the conflicting approaches and 
reasoning of the Labour Court (‘LC’) and LAC. Second, to consider the 
cogency of three arguments for why the LAC decision was wrongly decided. 
Third, to explain, while the LAC ruling stands, how the LRA limits the 
constitutional right of employees to protest in compliance with the RGA.  
Chapter five undertakes a limitation analysis to determine if either 
limitation justifiably limits the constitutional right of employees to freedom of 
assembly. After considering the factors expressly outlined in s36(1)(a)-(e), 
other relevant considerations, as well as arguments both for and against a 
finding of constitutional invalidity, I conclude that both limitations unjustifiably 
limit the constitutional right of employees to freedom of assembly.  
Chapter six summarises my conclusions and recommendations. First, 
that s210 of the LRA be amended to expressly permit off-duty employees to 
assemble and demonstrate in compliance with the RGA over disputes of 
 
19 As above, I do not consider if the RGA is constitutional or unconstitutional in this respect 
given that this is similarly beyond the scope of this thesis.   
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mutual interest in certain circumstances. Second, that the statutory definition 
of protest action in s213 of the LRA be amended to expressly permit purely 
political protest action, provided it is limited in scope and duration and subject 





CHAPTER TWO  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: OUTLINE OF THE TWO 
STAGE LIMITATION ANALYSIS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY  
2.1. INTRODUCTION   
All Bill of Rights, in some form, provides a mechanism whereby their 
guarantees may, in certain circumstances, be legitimately infringed by the 
state.1 At least two primary justifications exist for giving the state this power. 
First, to ensure the unrestricted exercise of constitutional rights do not 
impermissibly infringe upon corresponding rights held by others.2 Second, to 
allow the state, within boundaries, to reconcile the inevitable conflict that arises 
between the exercise and enjoyment of constitutional rights and competing 
societal interests.3  
 Section 36(1) of the South African Constitution, the general limitation 
clause, contains specific criteria against which the constitutionality of any 
limitation must be assessed. It attracts a distinct two stage enquiry4 - an 
inevitable feature of any “general limitation clause”.5 First, whether the 
constitutional right is in fact limited by the impugned law.6 Second, if yes, 
whether the limitation complies with the requirements of s36(1).7 Legislation 
 
1 Halton Cheadle ‘Limitations’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2018) 30:2 who explains that ‘if no mechanism is 
[expressly] provided in the Bill of Rights for doing so, the courts develop such mechanisms’. 
2 See SATAWU v Garvis 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC) para 53, Hotz v UCT 2017 (2) SA 485 (SCA) 
para 62-3; Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC) para 28. 
3 Cheadle op cit (n1). See further Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 
ed (2013) 150 who mention competing societal concerns such as ‘public order, safety, health 
and democratic values’. I consider competing societal concerns relevant to the present 
discussion in chapter five where the justifiability of both limitations is considered.  
4 Minister of Safety and Security: In Re S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) para 26-27.  
5 See S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at 414 and S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
at para 100. See further Stuart Woolman & Henk Botha ‘Limitations’ in Stuart Woolman & 
Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 3 ed (2013) 34:6 who discuss Art 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the limitation clause which s36(1) of the South 
African Constitution is principally based upon.   
6 Zuma ibid. I use the phrase “impugned law” and “challenged law” interchangeably.  




which limits a constitutional right is therefore not per se unconstitutional.8 
Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it cannot be justified as a permissible 
infringement according to the justifying criteria in s36(1) of the Constitution.9 
 In this chapter, I outline the two-stage limitation analysis within which 
both limitations the LRA imposes upon the constitutional right of employees to 
freedom of assembly must be assessed. My present intention is not to 
demonstrate how the LRA limits this constitutional right nor determine the 
constitutionality of the limitations in terms s36(1). Both questions are 
addressed in subsequent chapters.10 Rather, my immediate aim is to outline 
the framework and principles the following chapters utilise to demonstrate both 
limitations and subsequently assess their constitutionality.  First, I provide a 
high-level outline of the two-stage limitation analysis. Second, I discuss several 
principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation one must apply at the 
first stage of the limitation analysis to determine both the content of a 
constitutional right and whether it is limited by the challenged law. Third, I 
discuss the content of the constitutional right to freedom of assembly by 
canvassing the spheres of activity the right protects - but also should protect - 
both generally and in the labour law sphere.  
2.2. THE TWO-STAGE LIMITATION ANALYSIS IN A NUTSHELL 
As noted, the limitation analysis consists of two distinct stages.11 For 
convenience, I refer to the first stage as the “threshold stage” and the second 
as the “justifiability stage”.12  
The threshold stage requires the applicant to establish that the 
challenged law limits a constitutional right.13 If no limitation is established, the 
 
8 See Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 para 40.  
9S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) para 72. Section s36(2) however does provide for a 
limited instance where constitutional rights can legitimately be limited outside the ambit of the 
general limitation clause. See AZAPO v President RSA 1996 (4) SA 672 (CC) para 10.  
10 Chapters three and four demonstrate both limitations. Chapter five then considers whether 
either limitation complies with the justifying criteria contained in s36(1) of the Constitution. See 
further the outline provided at 1.3 of chapter one.   
11 See Zuma supra (n5) where Kentridge AJ summarised the two-stage approach as follows: 
‘First, has there been a contravention of a guaranteed right? If so, is it justified under the 
limitation clause’. See also Coetzee v Government RSA 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) para 9.  
12 See Walters supra (n4) where Kriegler J used similar terminology to describe each stage. 




constitutional challenge is dismissed there and then.14 Where a limitation is 
established, the justifiability stage ensues to determine if the limitation is 
constitutional by testing it against the justifying criteria contained in s36(1) of 
the Constitution.15 If the limitation complies with s36(1), it passes constitutional 
muster.16 If not, it must be declared unconstitutional in terms of s172(1)(a) of 
the Constitution to the extent it unjustifiably infringes that constitutional right.17  
(a) Threshold stage 
Primarily, this is an exercise in constitutional and statutory interpretation.18 It 
requires the applicant to establish two things: (a) that the content of a 
constitutional right; is (b) limited by the meaning and effect of the challenged 
law.19 Whilst both enquires are interrelated, they should be considered 
separately as they are, technically speaking, conceptually distinct.20 This is 
because the first enquiry is an exercise in constitutional interpretation, 
requiring an analysis of the right’s meaning to determine the  sphere and type 
of activity it protects.21 By contrast, the second enquiry is an exercise in 
statutory interpretation. It requires interpreting the provisions of the challenged 
law to determine whether their meaning and effect limits the constitutional right 
in question.22 Hereafter, I refer to the first sub-enquiry as the “scope and 
content enquiry” and the second as the “infringement” or “limitation” enquiry.  
 Determining the content of a constitutional right, by way of constitutional 
 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 104. While Makwanyane considered the limitation clause 
under s33(1) of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 (‘the Interim Constitution’), the 
Makwanyane statement applies equally to s36(1) of the Final Constitution. See National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) para 33-35.  
17 Section 172(1)(a) enjoins every court with jurisdiction to decide  constitutional matters within 
its power to declare law or conduct inconsistent the Constitution to be invalid to ‘the extent of 
its inconsistency’. See Dawood supra (n8) at para 59. 
18 Moise v Germiston City Council 2001 (4) SA 491 (CC) para 5-6.  
19 Walters supra (n4). See 2.3(b)(i) below where this is discussed further.  
20 While these two-sub-enquiries are not always expressly articulated by the courts, Kriegler J 
in Walters ibid arguably found that the threshold stage involves two sub-enquiries. This is 
supported by Woolman & Botha op cit (n5) 34:4 and Pierre De Vos ‘The Limitation of Rights’ 
in Pierre de Vos & Warren Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2013) 355. 
21Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 79. 




interpretation, is an inherently value laden and normative exercise.23 
Inevitably, it requires courts to make a moral value judgement about the type 
and sphere of activity a right protects or, to put it differently, what it should 
protect.24 The general principle articulated by the Constitutional Court (‘CC’) is 
that constitutional rights should be interpreted generously and purposively.25 
In several decisions, the CC has held the two-stage approach will often require 
interpreting the right broadly at the threshold stage, only to qualify its content 
at the justifiability stage, where the constitutionality (or justifiability) of any 
limitation is assessed.26 In this sense, the two-stage approach significantly 
influences the interpretation of constitutional rights.27 This broad interpretation, 
as adopted by the CC, will therefore, generally speaking, make it easier to 
establish a limitation at the threshold stage.28 In this instance, most of the 
analysis will turn on whether the limitation complies with s36(1) at the 
justifiability stage of the analysis - not whether the right is actually infringed by 
the challenged law at the threshold stage.29  
 Once the content of the right is determined, the second part of the 
threshold stage, the infringement sub-enquiry, takes place. This requires 
interpreting the impugned law to determine if it limits the right.30 However, all 
 
23 Zuma supra (n5) at para 17 endorsed by Kriegler J in Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 207. 
See also Lourens du Plessis ‘Interpretation’ in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2013) 32:47 
24 See Matiaso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1994 (3) SA 592 (SE) 5971B-
598B and Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at para 37.  
25 See Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 100 and Viking Pony Pumps (Pty) Ltd v t/a Tricom 
Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd 2011 (1) SA 327 (CC) para 32. I discuss what this 
generous and purposive approach requires at 2.3(a)(i) below.  
26 See Zuma supra (n5) at para 21 endorsed Ferreira supra (n29#4) at para 58. For a practical 
illustration see De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local division) 2004 
(1) SA 406 (CC) at para 48 in casu, criminalising possession of child pornography limits the 
constitutional right to freedom of expression but is a justifiable limitation in terms of s36(1).  
27 See Cheadle op cit (n1) at 30:4, De Vos op cit (n20) at 357 and Kevin Iles ‘A Fresh Look at 
Limitations: Unpacking Section 36’ (2007) 28 SAJHR 70-71.  
28 Zuma supra (n5) at para 21. However, this is subject to ‘reading down’ and the rebuttable 
presumption of constitutionality discussed below at 2.3(b)(i).  
29 See De Vos op cit (n20) at 357. Some CC decisions adopt a ‘notional approach’ by simply 
assuming, without properly applying the threshold stage, that the right is limited, and then 
proceeding directly to the justifiability stage. See, for example,  Beinash v Ernst & Young 1999 
(2) SA 91 (CC) and Christian Education SA v Minister of Education 1999 (2) SA 83 (CC). This 
is rightly criticised by Woolman & Botha op cit (n5) at 34:17-34:18.  




law is rebuttably presumed to be compatible with the Bill of Rights.31 In this 
sense, the court must first attempt to interpret the challenged law in a manner 
which does not limit the right, provided such an interpretation is ‘reasonably 
possible’, before considering any alternative interpretation which limits it.32  I 
explain what this entails when the indirect application of the Bill of Rights is 
discussed below.33   
(b) Justifiability stage 
If the applicant establishes a limitation, the justifiability stage ensues. This 
requires applying s36(1) of the Constitution to determine if the reasons for, and 
the purpose of, the limitation is sufficiently compelling to condone infringing  a 
constitutional right.34 The onus to establish justification rests on the party 
seeking to uphold the limitation.35 In other words, once a limitation is 
established, the onus shifts to the respondent to establish its constitutionality.36 
 Two threshold requirements are necessary, but not sufficent, for 
justifiability to be established. First, the limitation must be sourced in a ‘law of 
general application’.37 Broadly, this means the limitation must take place in 
terms of something recognised as ‘law’.38 In most cases, this requirement is 
met.39 However, by way of illustration, a mere executive policy40 or 
 
31 See George Devenish ‘The Theory and Methodology for Constitutional Interpretation in 
South Africa’ 69 (2006) THRHR 238. On a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality generally 
see Zimbabwe Township Developers (Pvt) Ltd v Lou’s Shoes (Pvt) Ltd 1984 (2) SA 778 (ZS) 
at 783A-D. 
32 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) para 11. See Bertie van 
Zyl (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (2) SA 181 (CC) at para 23 where Mokgoro 
J held that any constitutionally compliant interpretation cannot be ‘far-fetched’. 
33 At 2.3(b)(i) below.   
34 Cheadle op cit (n1) at 30:8. 
35 Minister of Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) para 34 referring to Moise supra 
(n18) at para 19. 
36 In Phillips v Director v of Public Prosecutions 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC) at para 20, Yacoob J 
held that even if no attempt is made to justify the limitation, the court still has an obligation to 
consider, mero motu if necessary, whether the limitation is justifiable.  
37 Section 36(1) states ‘the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of a law of 
general application’ (emphasis added).  
38 De Vos op cit (n20). The most comprehensive examination of this requirement appears in 
the minority judgment of Mokgoro J in President RSA v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 104. 
39 Woolman & Botha op cit (n5) at 34:47.  
40 See Ramakatsa v Magashule 2013 (2) BCLR 202 (CC) and August v Electoral Commission 




employment practice41 which limits a constitutional right, cannot, for example, 
ever be justifiable as neither constitute a ‘law of general application’.42 Second, 
the limitation must strive to achieve a legitimate government purpose,43 and a 
rational connection must exist between the limitation and any purpose it seeks 
to achieve.44 Similar to the law of general application requirement, rationality 
is generally met in most, but not necessarily all, cases.45 This is because 
rationality is a low threshold46 and is met provided there is a rational connection 
between the limitation and any legitimate purpose it strives to achieve.47 
 If both threshold requirements are established, one can determine if the 
reasons for, and purpose of, the limitation is sufficiently compelling so as to be 
justifiable. Section 36(1) states that this is established when, after considering 
all relevant factors, the limitation is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’.48  
Section 36(1)(a)-(e) mentions several relevant factors such as: the 
nature of the right; the purpose of the limitation;  the relationship between the 
limitation and its purpose; the nature and extent of the limitation and whether 
less restrictive means exist to achieve it. These factors do not constitute a 
closed list.49 Neither should they be applied mechanically.50 Rather, all 
relevant factors must be weighed to determine whether a proportional balance 
is struck overall between: (a) the importance and purpose of the limitation; 
versus (b) the nature of the infringement, its severity and whether less 
restrictive means exist to achieve its purpose.51 No universal standard exists 
 
41 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA I (CC) para 41. 
42 For a comprehensive discussion, see Woolman & Botha op cit (n5) at 34:47-34:67. 
43 Magajane v North West Gambling Board 2006 (5) SA 250 (CC) para 65. 
44 See Holomisa v Holomisa 2019 (2) BCLR 247 (CC) para 25 and S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 
642 (CC) para 15. On rationality generally, see DA v President RSA 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) 
para 27.  
45 De Vos op cit (n20) at 371. See Holomisa ibid and Print Media South Africa and Another v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2012 (6) SA 443 (CC) para 81.  
46 See DA v President RSA supra (n44) at para 42. 
47 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC) para 49. 
48 Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 100. 
49 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) para 37.   
50 See S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) at para 32 endorsed in Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) 
Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA 2011 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 54. 
51 S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 18. I discuss the concept of “proportionality” and 




to determine justifiability as each case necessarily depends upon on its own 
facts and circumstances.52  
2.3. THRESHOLD STAGE: INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT AND THE CHALLENGED LAW  
(a) Scope and content enquiry: protected ambit of the right  
Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides three express instructions as to how 
the Bill of Rights must be interpreted. It reads:   
 ‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –  
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;  
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law’ 
Section 39(1) however is not an exhaustive account of how to interpret 
the Bill of Rights.53 Other relevant factors include: (a) the text of the right;54 (b) 
its purpose;55 (c) its history;56 (d) its  context;57 and (e) its connection to other 
constitutional rights.58 I explain, and apply, several of these factors at the end 
of this chapter where the content of the constitutional right to freedom of 
assembly is discussed.59 First, I outline the general approach (or theory) of 
rights interpretation articulated by the CC in terms of s39(1)(a). Second, I 
consider the injunction to consider international law and the discretion to 
consider foreign law in terms of s39(1)(b) and (c) respectively.  
 
52 Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 104. See however 5.2 of chapter five where I discuss  
various factors which may heighten the standard of justification on the respondent.  
53 Du Plessis op cit (n23) at 32:125. See also Currie & de Waal op cit (n3) at 135 who note 
that ‘…the instructions contained in s39, important as they may be, are themselves sufficiently 
abstract as to require a great deal of interpretation’.   
54 Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 9, Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC).  
55 Shabalala v Attorney General of the Traansvaal 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) para 26.  
56 SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 (6) SA 123 (CC) para 29-34; Garvis supra (n2) at para 
62-3.  
57 Ferreira supra (n24) at para 82.  
58 See Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 27 and SANDU v 
Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) para 8. 
59 At 2.4(a) below. I also consider the relevance of some of these factors when applying s36(1) 




(i) General approach towards Bill of Rights interpretation  
Early CC decisions, partly relying upon s39(1)(a) and partly upon comparative 
constitutional law jurisprudence,60 articulated the general principle that all  
constitutional rights should be interpreted both generously and purposively, 
within the framework of the values of the Constitution as a whole.61  
 This factor has two interconnected components. First, a generous 
interpretation requires courts to construe constitutional rights in a manner that 
seeks to maximise their enjoyment and minimise interference with them.62 One 
logical consequence is that constitutional rights should not be interpreted 
narrowly by reading implicit limitations into them.63 Furthermore, where 
legislation limits a right, that limitation should be narrowly construed to ensure 
it limits the right no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose.64 Second, 
a purposive and value based interpretation requires identifying the underlying 
purpose of the right, and then interpreting it in a manner which gives effect 
both to its purpose and constitutional values.65 This must be objectively 
determined within the context of the Constitution as a whole, ultimately 
entailing a value judgment as to what the right should (or should not) protect.66  
(ii) The role of international and foreign law  
The injunction in s39(1)(b) to ‘consider international law’ reflects the significant 
influence international human rights law had upon the Bill of Rights drafters.67  
The CC has interpreted this to considering both binding and non-binding 
 
60 See the Privy Council decision of Lord Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) v 
Fisher [1980] AC 319 (PC) 328-329 endorsed in both Zuma supra (n5) at para 14 and S v 
Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 8. See also the significant reliance by the CC upon the 
Canadian Supreme Court decision in R v Big M Drug Mart 1985 18 DLR (4th) 321 at 395-396 
cited in, amongst others, Zuma ibid; Makwanyane supra (n5) and Department of Land Affairs 
v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 199 (CC) para 51.  
61 See JR de Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) at 250-254.  
62 Curie & de Waal op cit (n3) at 138, Cheadle op cit (n1) at 34:14. 
63 SATAWU v Moloto NO 2012 (6) SA 249 (CC) para 72. See the discussion of Business SA 
v COSATU 1997 (5) BLLR 511 (LAC) at 3.1(b)(i) where the LAC arguably failed to adhere to 
this principle when interpreting the constitutional right to strike in s23(2)(c) of the Constitution. 
64 TAWUSA obo Ngedle v Unitrans Fuel (Pty) Ltd 2016 (37) ILJ 2485 (CC) para 52-53. See 
2.3(b) below where “reading down” is considered. 
65 Currie & de Waal op cit (n3) at 137.  
66 Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 88. See also Ex Parte Attorney General, Namibia: in re 
Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSC) 91D-F per Mahomed CJ. 




sources of relevant international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.68 
The CC has interpreted the phrase ‘international law’ broadly for the 
purposes of s39(1)(b) by holding that it includes not only customary 
international law,69 as well as conventions and treaties,70 but also: 
commentaries, recommendations and opinions by specialised bodies and 
tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights71 (‘ECHR’), special 
rapporteurs of the United Nations72 (‘UN’) as well as International Labour 
Organisation (‘ILO’) supervisory bodies such as the Committee on Freedom of 
Association73 (‘CFA’) and Committee of Experts on the Application on 
Conventions and Recommendations74 (‘ILO Committee of Experts’).75 
However, binding international law does enjoy greater weight as ‘the 
lawmakers of the Constitution should not lightly be presumed to authorise any 
law which might constitute a breach of the obligations of the state in terms 
international law.’76   
The relative weight afforded to international law will differ on a case by 
case basis, as courts should be mindful of textual, and other differences, 
between the Bill of Rights and international law.77 Furthermore, courts are only 
obliged to ‘consider’ international law which does not equate to an inflexible 
duty to interpret constitutional rights consistently with international law in every 
instance.78  Thus, it is submitted that interpreting the Bill of Rights differently 
 
68 See Makwanyane supra (n5) at para 35.   
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. See Mlungwana v S 2019 (1) SACR 429 (CC) para 58 where Petse AJ relied upon the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when interpreting the constitutional right to 
demonstrate and assemble. Mlungwana is discussed further at 3.2(c)(i) of chapter three. 
71 Zuma supra (n5) at para 32.  
72 See Garvis supra (n2) at para 64 where Moegeng CJ referred to a report by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions when interpreting the right to 
freedom of assembly. See 3.2(c)(ii) of chapter three where Garvis is discussed further.   
73 Moloto NO supra (n63) at para 58-9.  
74 NUMSA v Bader Bop 2003 (3) SA 513 (CC) para 29, AMCU v Chamber of Mines 2017 (3) 
SA 242 (CC) para 52.  
75 This list however is not exhaustive. See further John Dugard International Law: A South 
African Perspective 4 ed (2011). 
76 AZAPO supra (n9) at para 26. See further Glenister v President RSA 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) 
para 179-193. 
77Government RSA v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 26.  




or, even inconsistently, with international law will not necessarily give rise to 
constitutional difficulty provided relevant sources of international law are 
properly considered when the court interprets the right in question.79 
The above principles apply equally to the consideration of foreign law 
in terms of s39(1)(c).80 The only real distinction between the two provisions is 
that the courts are peremptorily obliged to consider international law, but enjoy 
a discretion to consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.81 
(b) Limitation enquiry: meaning and effect of the impugned law  
Section 39(2) similarly contains express instructions as to how the courts must 
interpret the impugned law. It states: 
‘When interpreting any legislation…every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ 
 Section 39(2) is equally not an exhaustive account of how to interpret 
the challenged law. First, I discuss constitutional avoidance and two 
concomitant principles: (a) “reading down”; and (b) the presumption of 
constitutionality. Second, I explain the principle of constitutional subsidiarity 
applicable to legislation which is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right.   
(i) Statutory interpretation: the indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights, reading down and subsidiarity  
The interpretation of the challenged law is governed by the indirect application 
of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights indirectly influences the interpretation of 
the challenged law due to the ‘principle of avoidance’.82 Constitutional 
avoidance means wherever it is possible to decide a dispute without directly 
deciding a constitutional issue, i.e applying the Bill of Rights directly, that route 
 
79 Grootboom supra (n77).  
79 See 3.1(c) of chapter three where I discuss the position of the ILO CFA which states that 
purely political protest action does not enjoy protection under international law principles of 
freedom of association. See ILO Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles 
of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO 5 ed (2006) para 
526. 
80 See Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 62 and Fose 
v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 90 and 106.  
81 See S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) at paras 26 and 57.  




should be preferred.83 In this sense, whenever legislation is alleged to infringe 
a constitutional right, constitutional avoidance requires the court to first attempt 
to decide the dispute without ruling upon the constitutionality of that law.84  
 However, this does not mean no consideration should be given to 
constitutional principles or the underlying right. This is for two reasons. First, 
where two interpretations of a law exist - neither of which limit a fundamental 
right - the court must prefer the interpretation which better ‘promotes the spirit, 
purport and object of the Bill of Rights’.85 Second, where legislation is shown, 
prima facie, to limit a fundamental right, the indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights requires the court to first attempt to interpret the challenged legislation 
consistently with the Bill of Rights.86 This principle is known as ‘reading 
down’.87 Broadly, it means where two interpretations of the impugned law exist: 
(a) one which limits a constitutional right; and (b) one which does not, the 
second interpretation must be preferred provided the text of the statute is 
‘reasonably capable’ of bearing the second interpretation.88 Reading down 
however is not unfettered.89 Where the text cannot ‘reasonably bear’ a  
constitutionally compliant meaning, the court must proceed to the justifiability 
stage to determine whether the limitation passes constitutional muster.90   
Practically, the duty to apply, and exhaust, reading down before directly 
applying the Bill of Rights to the challenged law means all legislation is  
 
83 Zantsi v Council of State Ciskei 1995 (4) SA 615 (CC) para 8.  
84 S v Dlamini 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) para 27.  
85 See Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo 2009 (1) SA 33 (CC) para 46 and 84 and Moloto NO 
supra (n63) at para 71-72.  
86 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offence v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: 
in re Hyundai Motor Distributors v Smit NO 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 22.  
87 Currie & de Waal op cit (n3) at 68-69.  
88 SAPS v POPCRU 2011 (6) SA 1 (CC) para 29.  
89 See Jason Brickhill & Michael Bishop ‘In the beginning was the word: the role of text in the 
interpretation of statutes’ (4) 129 SALJ 681 who argue the CC has, failed on several occasions, 
to recognise that ‘reading down’ is constrained by what the text is ‘reasonably capable’ of 
meaning. 
90 Hyundai supra (n86) at para 24. See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para 23-24 where the CC held the word 




rebuttably presumed to be compatible with the Bill of Rights.91 Therefore, when 
legislation is challenged on the basis it limits a constitutional right, the first 
question, once the content of the right has been established, is whether the 
challenged law is reasonably capable of an interpretation which does not limit 
that fundamental right.92 Only in circumstances where the legislation cannot 
bear such an interpretation, does one apply the Bill of Rights directly to 
ascertain if it complies with the justifying criteria in s36(1) of the Constitution.93  
One final principle related to constitutional avoidance is the principle of 
subsidiarity.94 This principle states that whenever legislation is enacted to give 
effect to a constitutional right, such as the RGA95 and LRA96 respectively, 
litigants cannot directly rely on the constitutional right to vindicate it.97 Rather, 
they must instead utilise the statutory remedies and procedures provided for 
any legislation which “gives effect” to the practical exercise of that right in 
practice.98 However, direct reliance on the underlying constitutional right is 
permissible if the constitutionality of the legislation itself is challenged.99 
2.4. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY: CONTENT OF THE RIGHT   
Section 17 of the Bill of Rights reads as follows:  
“Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to 
 
91 See Dennis Davis ‘Interpretation of the Bill of Rights’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL 
Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2018) 33:4 and Laugh it 
off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) para 48. 
92 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) para 89. This applies even where a 
litigant does not rely upon s39(2). See Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Grundlingh 2007 
(6) SA 350 (CC) para 26-27. At 3.1(c) of chapter three and 4.4(a) of chapter four, I consider if 
either limitation is avoidable by utilising reading down.  
93 See Richter v Minister of Home Affairs 2009 (3) SA 615 (CC) para 62-63 and 70-71.  
94 On its various meanings see the minority judgment of Cameron J in My Vote Counts NPC v 
Speaker of the National Assembly 2015 (12) BCLR 1407 (CC) para 44-66. 
95 Which gives effect to s17 of the Bill of Rights. See ADT Security v NASUWU 2012 (33) ILJ 
575 (LC) para 11.  
96 Which gives effect to s23 of the Bill of Rights. See NAPTOSA v Minister of Education 2001 
(2) SA 112 (C) endorsed in SANDU v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) para 51.  
97 SANDU ibid para 52.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid. I return to this principle at 3.2 of chapter three where distinctions between the LRA and 
RGA are discussed and at 4.3(b)(ii) of chapter four where the LAC’s reliance on it in ADT 




demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions’100    
First, I discuss the right to assemble and demonstrate. Second, I 
consider the right to picket. Third, I briefly explain the ‘peaceful and unarmed’ 
internal modifiers.101 
(a) ‘Assemble and demonstrate’ 
Section 17 guarantees the right of ‘everyone’102 to assemble peacefully and 
unarmed for the purpose of manifesting opposition, or support, for any lawful 
demand or cause both against the state and private persons or institutions.103 
Simply put, this means any law which impedes or restricts the ability of any 
group or person to exercise the right in this manner will limit it.104   
 Three particular factors are worth emphasising when determining the 
content of the right to freedom of assembly: (a) its history; (b) its purpose; and 
(c) its role in faciliting the exercise of other constitutional rights.105  
First, the history of the right is particularly significant.106 This is because, 
during the Apartheid era, the state progressively enacted several pieces of 
security legislation107 designed to systemically erode and deny the common 
law right to assemble and demonstrate.108 Fortifying this, is the fact that one 
central purpose of the Bill of Rights is to prevent similar abuses of fundamental 
 
100 I do not consider petitions which is beyond the scope of this work and unnecessary for 
present purposes. For a general discussion see Stuart Woolman ‘Freedom of Assembly’ in 
Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 43:25-43:26.   
101 ‘Internal modifies’ are defined by De Vos op cit (n20) at 358 as words or phrases in the text 
of the right which ‘explicitly exclude certain practices from protection or condition its application 
more subtly’. See Cheadle op cit (n1) at 30:7-30:8 who criticises the use of this concept.  
102 ‘Everyone’ in the Bill of Rights must be literally construed. This means, workers clearly 
benefit from the right See Mlungwana supra (n70) at para 62 and Kylie v CCMA 2010 (4) SA 
383 (LAC) para 17-22.  
103 Dennis Davis ‘Assembly’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2018) 12:2.  
104 Mlungwana supra (n70) at para 43, Garvis supra (n2) at para 57 and 61. Section 7(2) of 
the Constitution also requires the state to ensure the law ‘respects, protects, promotes and 
fulfils’ its exercise.  
105 See 2.3(a) above.  
106 See Garvis supra (n2) at para 62-63 where the CC placed similar emphasis on this factor. 
107 For instance, the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 and Suppression of Communism Act 
44 of 1950. For an analysis of these laws, see Michael Kidd ‘Meetings and Emergency 
Regulations’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 471 and Tsoaeli v S 2018 (1) SACR 42 (FB) para 18-24. 
108 See S v Turrell 1973 (1) SA 248 (C) and Elilson Kahn ‘Freedom of Assembly’ (1973) 90 




rights by the state.109 Therefore, given this history, it would be necessary to 
establish particularly persuasive reasons to justify restricting its exercise.110 
Second, the purpose of the right to free assembly, broadly speaking, is 
to enable groups which lack political or economic power, such as blue-collar 
workers for instance, to express opposition, or support, for or against causes 
of importance to them outside the confines of official political institutions.111 Its 
underlying and fundamental value therefore lies in its ability to force public 
institutions, or private individuals, to seriously consider the demands of 
politically weak or marginalised groups.112 Therefore, without it, the ability of 
these groups to meaningfully participate in, and influence, the course of 
democratic politics is significantly undermined.113 In this sense, freedom of 
assembly is an indispensable component of participatory democracy.114 
Third, and particularly significant, is the fact freedom of assembly is 
intrinsically connected to, and underpinned by, several other constitutional 
rights such as: expression, association and dignity.115 This is because 
assemblies constitute forms of expressive conduct which means the ability of 
vulnerable groups – such as workers – to effectively assemble and protest is 
rendered illusory if there exists no corresponding right to free expression.116 
Similarly, the right to freedom of association necessarily incorporates a right of 
the members of an association to pursue the objectives of the association to 
 
109 See Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) para 40.   
110 Garvis supra (n2) at  para 52. See similar comments expressed by the Lesotho Supreme 
Court in Seeiso v Minister of Home Affairs 1998 (6) BCLR 765 (LesCA).  
111 See Garvis Ibid para 61 and Woolman op cit (n100).   
112 See Woolman op cit note 100 at 43:21 – 43:22 who identifies eight further purposes which 
underlie the constitutional right to freedom of assembly.  
113 Woolman ibid.  
114 See Henk Botha ‘Fundamental Rights and Democratic Contestation: Reflections on 
Freedom of Assembly in an Unequal Society’ (2017) 21 LDD 1221 and the German 
Constitutional Court decision in Brokdorf 69 Bverf GE 315 345 (1985) discussed in Woolman 
ibid at 43:22 and Davis op cit (n103) 12:1. On participatory democracy generally, see Doctors 
for Life v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) para 112-16. I expand on 
the connection between participatory democracy and freedom of assembly in specific relation 
to the rights and interests of workers at 3.2(a) of chapter three and 5.3 of chapter five.  
115 See S v Mamabolo supra (n9) at para 50, Hotz supra (n2) at para 62 and SANDU supra 
(n58) at para 8. On the interconnection between constitutional rights generally see Grootboom 
supra (n77) at para 23.  




which they belong, such as workers belonging to a trade union, through 
mechanisms such as mass assemblies or demonstrations.117 Finally, dignity 
underpins all three rights as prohibiting (or restricting) individuals or groups 
from publicly pursuing objectives or causes of importance to them undermines 
their sense of agency and moral worth.118 In this sense, legislation which limits 
freedom of assembly will - almost invariably - correspondingly infringe 
constitutional rights to expression, association and also arguably dignity.119 
(b)  ‘Picket’  
Pickets are usually conducted by workers during workplace disputes.120 One 
explanation for including it in s17, and not s23 of the Bill of Rights,121 was to 
extend the right to picket ‘beyond the sphere of employer-employee relations’ 
alone.122 On this basis, picketing under the RGA in support of an assembly or 
demonstration concerning a non-labour dispute would be protected as part of 
the general constitutional right to freedom of assembly123  
Picketing, in the labour context, describes ‘any conduct designed to 
gain publicity and support for the workers cause’124 which is widely regarded 
as a ‘necessary corollary’ of the constitutional right to strike.125 Its purpose 
includes: persuading non-strikers to join the industrial action, informing the 
 
117 See SANDU supra (n58) at para 8, Pilane v Pilane 2013 (4) BCLR 431 (CC) para 69-70 
and Nicholas Haysom ‘Freedom of Association’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom 
(eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2018) at 13:4 who refers to NAACP 
v Alabama (1958) 357 US 449 where the United States Supreme Court recognised freedom 
of association is a ‘necessary implication…of the freedoms to expression and assembly’.  
118 On dignity and the interpretation of constitutional rights see Laurie Ackerman Human 
Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa (2015) and Dawood supra (n8) at para 34-35.  
119 I expand further on this theme at 3.1(c)(ii) of chapter three and 5.2 of chapter five. See 
4.4(c) of chapter four where I also examine potential connections between free assembly and 
the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining in s23(5) of the Constitution. 
120 Woolman op cit (n100) 43:24.  
121 Which, as above, guarantees various rights regarding ‘labour relations’.  
122 Woolman op cit (n100) at 43:24.  
123 Emma Fergus ‘Pickets, socio-economic protest action, gatherings and demonstrations’ in 
Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 158. However, see the discussion of ADT 
Security v NASUWU 2015 (36) ILJ 152 (LAC) in chapter four where I explain why it is less 
clear if the LRA permits employees to picket under the RGA where a labour dispute is involved.   
124 Ibid.   
125 Section 23(2)(c) of the Bill of Rights. Just as the constitutional right to strike is similarly 
regarded as a ‘necessary corollary of the constitutional right to engage in collective 
bargaining’. On both points see Halton Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis 




public about the reasons for the strike, to canvass support and pressurise 
suppliers and the public to boycott the workers’ employer.126 As above, 
picketing could equally be used for this same purpose outside a labour dispute. 
For instance: to raise awareness, or canvass support for, a protest regarding 
austerity measures or lack of housing or encourage the public to boycott a 
company involved in environmental pollution or for example.   
Section 69 of the LRA and the ‘Code of Good Practice: Picketing’ 
regulate pickets in the labour law sphere.127 Section 69(1) states a picket is 
protected when called by a registered trade union for the purpose of ‘peacefully 
demonstrating’ in support of any protected strike or in opposition to any 
lockout.128 Participation in a protected picket attracts the same protections as 
protected strike action.129 Unprotected pickets, and unlawful picketing conduct, 
can however be interdicted by the LC.130 
(c) Internal modifiers: ‘peaceful and unarmed’ 
Assemblies, demonstrations and pickets receive constitutional protection only 
when exercised both: (a) ‘peacefully’ and (b) ‘unarmed’.131 The practical effect 
of both internal modifiers is that violent or armed assemblies, demonstrations 
or pickets can be restricted (or prohibited) by the state without the need for 
justification under s36(1) of the Constitution, because such restrictions will not 
restrict (or limit) conduct protected by the content s17 of the Bill of Rights.132  
The qualification that assemblies and demonstrations be exercised 
 
126 Dennis Davis & Norman Arendse ‘Picketing’ (1988) 26 Industrial Law Journal 26.  
127 Fergus op cit (n123). On what constitutes acceptable picketing conduct, see Picardi Hotels 
Ltd v FGWU 1999 (6) BLLR 601 (LC) para 25.  
128 See Fergus ibid at 160-171 on the requirements and consequences of protected versus 
unprotected picketing. Section 69(2)(a) provides that the picket can be held at any place to 
which the public has access and outside the premises of the employer. See 3.2(c)(ii) of chapter 
three where I discuss the connection between public pickets and the possibility of joint and 
several liability for riot damage under s11(1) of the RGA.  
129 Under s69(7) as read with s67 of the LRA. See 3.1(b) of chapter three where these 
protections are discussed.  
130 See Fergus op cit (n124) at 168-169. It also possible for parties affected by the picket, who 
are not employers, to interdict unprotected pickets or unlawful picketing conduct in the High 
Court per Growthpoint Properties Ltd v SACCAWU 2011 (1) BCLR 81 (KZD) para 15. 
131 Garvis supra (n2) at para 53.  
132 Ibid. See Islamic Unity Convention supra (n2) at para 31 where the same principle regarding 
the internal modifiers in s16(2) of the Bill of Rights - the exclusion of hate speech and 




peacefully and without arms, in order to receive constitutional protection, 
accords with similar restrictions that exist in international law instruments133 
and foreign jurisdictions that enshrine free assembly as a justiciable  
constitutional right.134 However, individual protesters do not lose constitutional 
protection simply because other protesters are armed or have committed acts 
of violence.135 
2.5. CONCLUSION  
This chapter sought to provide a high level, yet thorough, account of the two-
stage limitation analysis and the constitutional right to freedom of assembly, 
both for workers and marginalised members of society generally. I apply this 
framework in the remainder of this thesis in two parts. First, by establishing 
two limitations the LRA imposes upon the constitutional right of workers to 
freedom of assembly. Second, at the justifiability stage, by examining if either 
pass constitutional muster. The first limitation, the LRA’s prohibition on purely 









133 See Art 11 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and Art 21 of the ICCPR, 
both cited in Davis op cit (n103). A similar pre-condition is stipulated by the ILO CFA regarding  
strikes. See Bernard Gernignon, Alberto Odero & Guido Alberto Horacio ‘ILO Principles 
Concerning the Right to Strike’ (1998) 137 International Labour Law Review 444.  
134 Davis ibid at 12:2 cites Art 1 of the United States Constitution and s2(c) of the Canadian 
Charter, both of which require assemblies to be peaceful to enjoy constitutional protection.  
135 Garvis supra (n2) at para 53. However, whether the provisions of the RGA providing for 
joint and several liability for riot damage are consistent with this principle is debatable. See 




THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK: PROTEST ACTION AND 
GATHERINGS UNDER THE LRA AND RGA  
3.1. THE LRA AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROTEST ACTION 
(a) Background  
Historically, socio-economic protest action is derived from ‘stayaway’ protest 
action.1 In the late 1980’s to early 1990’s, stayaways were mass work 
stoppages organised by disenfranchised workers in protest against Apartheid 
policy, labour and tax legislation, local political issues and to commemorate 
events of importance to workers.2  
Section 65(1A) of the previous LRA3 rendered stayaways unlawful as 
they amounted to concerted refusals to work for purposes unrelated to 
workplace demands.4 This opened employees up to disciplinary action, and 
often dismissal, because participation amounted to common law misconduct 
in the form of absenteeism.5 While sympathetic employers implemented a 
policy of “no work, no pay, discipline”,6 others disciplined and dismissed 
stayaway participants.7 Despite several opportunities, the courts ‘resolutely 
 
1John Grogan Collective Labour Law 2 ed (2014) 290. Martin Brassey Commentary on the 
Labour Relations Act (2006) A4:91 defines a stayaway as, ‘a mass refusal to work in order to 
resist some political initiative or secure some political gain’. 
2 See Darcy du Toit, Shane Godfrey & Carole Cooper et al Labour Relations Law: A 
Comprehensive Guide 6 ed (2015) 380, PAK Le Roux & Andre van Niekerk ‘Protest Action in 
Support of Socio-economic Demands – The First Encounter’ (1997) CLL 81, Paul Benjamin & 
Clive Thompson South African Labour Law (2018) 355 and Jeremy Gauntlett & DF Smuts 
‘Boycotts: The Limits of Lawfulness’ (1990) 11 ILJ 940.  
3Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. On this requirement see Paul Benjamin ‘Political Stayaways: 
The dismissal of participants’ (1990) 11 ILJ 944-945 and Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle & 
Clive Thompson The New Labour Relations Act (1989) 78-80 and 85.   
4 Mbiyane v Cembad (Pty) Ltd t/a T A Art Centre 1989 (10) ILJ 468 (IC) at 470A-471E.  
5 Rehana Cassim ‘The Legal Status of Political Protest under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995’ (2008) 29 ILJ 2350.  
6 Du Toit et al op cit (n2) referring to BEEWU v MD Electrical 1990 (11) ILJ 87 (IC) 94D-E. 
7 See NUM v Amcoal Collieries & Industrial Operations Ltd 1992 (13) ILJ 1449 (LAC) at 1451G-
1452H and the discussion of this decision in Belinda Grant ‘Political Stay Aways in the Labour 
Appeal Court’ (1992) 4 South African Mercantile Law Journal 88.  
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declined’ to afford stayaways with legal protection.8 As a result, dismissed 
employees were only reinstated where it was established their employer 
selectively dismissed participants or failed to follow a fair procedure.9 
 The inability of the previous LRA to provide any express protection to 
stayaways attracted significant criticism from the ILO Fact Finding Commission 
in the early 1990s.10 This was because the previous LRA’s absolute prohibition 
on strike action, concerning workers social and economic interests, violated 
various international labour law principles of freedom of association.11 
Primarily, because the ILO Committee of Experts and Committee on Freedom 
of Association (‘CFA’)12 have interpreted the ILO Convention on Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise13 as recognising and 
protecting strike action over both industrial and socio-economic demands as 
legitimate under international law freedom of association principles.14  
However, the CFA do view ‘purely political strikes’ – or ‘purely political protest 
action’ - as unprotected by these same international law principles in terms of 
ILO Conventions.15 The ILO CFA view is considered further below.16   
To ensure the current LRA complied with the Republic’s obligations as 
 
8 Brassey op cit (n1) at A4:91.  This is best exemplified by ACTWUSA v African Hide Trading 
1989 (10) ILJ 475 (IC) cited in Du Toit op cit (n2) where the Industrial Court remarked that 
stayaways ‘serve no purpose, apart from disrupting the country’s economy and causing 
employers irreparable financial losses’. 
9 See NUM v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines (Operations) Ltd – President Steyn Mine, 
Brand Mine, Freddie’s Mine 1995 (16) ILJ 1371 (A). However, in certain circumstances, the 
Industrial Court found dismissals to be unfair where dismissed employees could not attend 
work due to intimidation or a lack of transport related to the stayaway. See Gana v Building 
Materials Manufacturers Ltd tia Doorcor (1990) 11 ILJ 564 (IC) at 568F-G.  
10 See Shamina Saley & Paul Benjamin ‘The Context of the ILO Fact Finding and Conciliation 
Report on South Africa’  (1992) 13 ILJ 757 and The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour 
Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 300.  
11 LRA Explanatory Memorandum ibid.   
12 Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association 
Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO (2006) para 521.   
13 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, Convention 1948 (No.87).  
14 See Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero & Horacio Guido ‘ILO Principles Concerning the Right 
to Strike’ (1998) 137 International Labour Law Review 443-444 and NUM v Amcoal Collieries 
& Industrial Operations Ltd 1990 (11) ILJ 1295 (IC) at 130E-J.  
15 See Jane Hodges Aeberhard, & Alberto Odero De Dios, Alberto ‘Principles of the Committee 
on Freedom of Association concerning Strikes’ (1987) 126 International Labour Law Review 
543 and Cassim op cit (n5) at 2351.    
16 At 3(c)(ii) below. On the influence of international law generally see 2.3(a)(ii) of chapter two. 
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an ILO member state,17 s77 acknowledged a new form of industrial action: to 
‘promote or defend the socio-economic interests of workers’.18 
(b) Legal framework: protected versus unprotected protest action  
Chapter IV of the LRA regulates both strikes and protest action.19 
Understanding how the LRA regulates protest action requires understanding 
how Chapter IV regulates strikes.20 While not identical, the LRA regulates both 
forms of industrial action analogously.21 Both must comply with procedural and 
substantive requirements22 for employees to receive protection against 
dismissal23 and civil immunity from contractual or delictual claims arising from 
participation in a strike or protest action respectively.24 Similar to strikes,25 the 
LRA therefore distinguishes between protest action that (a) complies with the 
substantive and procedural requirements (‘protected protest action’) versus (b) 
protest action which does not (‘unprotected protest action’).26  
For protesting employees, this distinction is of fundamental importance. 
Participation in unprotected protest action constitutes misconduct and attracts 
 
17 Section 1(b) of the LRA states one of its fundamental objects is to ‘give effect to obligations 
incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour Organisation’. Section 
3(c) similarly states the LRA must be interpreted ‘in compliance with the public international 
law obligations of the Republic’. See 3(c)(ii) below.   
18 Emma Fergus ‘Pickets, socio-economic protest action, gatherings and demonstrations’ in 
Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 172.  
19 Including picketing, discussed at 2.4(b) of chapter two. For an overview of chapter IV, see 
CWIU v Plascon Decorative (Inland) (Pty) Ltd 1998 (12) BLLR 1191 (LAC) para 17 and 21.   
20 Grogan op cit (n1) at 291.  
21 Fergus op cit (n18) at 174. 
22 Section 77(1)(a)-(d) considered at 3(b) below. See Bradley Conradie ‘Protected Strikes’ in 
Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 49-62 on the requirements for protected strikes. 
23 Section 187(a) states the dismissal of an employee because of their participation in 
protected protest action is automatically unfair.  
24Section 67(4) and (6). Section 67(8) however expressly excludes immunity for criminal 
offences. Section 67(5) further permits an employer to dismiss employees because of 
misconduct committed during the course of a protected protest or due to operational 
requirements. On how to determine whether the dismissal was because of participation in 
protest action, hence automatically unfair, see the two-part causation test in Kroukam v SA 
Airlink (Pty) Ltd 2005 (12) BLLR 1172 (LAC) para 103. 
25 Fergus op cit (n18) at 174.  
26 Ibid. Section 77(3) further states that any employee who participates in protected protest 
action in compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements in s77(1) enjoys the 
same protections provided for in s67 of the LRA.    
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no automatic protection against dismissal27 nor immunity from civil legal 
proceedings.28 The LC enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to interdict unprotected 
protest action and failure to comply with an interdict restraining unprotected 
protest action constitutes civil contempt of court.29  
However, even when protected, s77(2)(b) provides the LC with 
exclusive jurisdiction to grant a declatory order prescribing the duration of 
protection after considering: (a) the nature and duration of the protest; (b)  
steps taken by the union or federation to minimise harm caused by the protest; 
and (c) protester conduct.30 Section 77(2)(b) thus empowers the LC, in certain 
circumstances, to render protected protest action unprotected.31 When 
considering such a declaratory order, the LC must conduct a proportionality 
assessment, not dissimilar to the proportionality enquiry applicable to s36(1) 
of the Constitution.32 Proportionality requires the LC, when exercising this 
discretion, to consider, and weigh, all relevant factors including: the importance 
of the matter giving rise to the protest and all other relevant factors, including, 
but not limited to, those referred to in s77(2)(b)(i)-(iii).33 
The statutory preconditions for protected protest action, most 
significantly the substantive requirements, are considered immediately below.  
(i) Substantive requirements  
The primary substantive requirement is that the protest comply with the 
 
27 However, any dismissal for participation in unprotected protest action must still be both 
procedurally and substantively fair under s188(1) of the LRA. The Schedule 8 Code of Good 
Practice: Dismissal must equally be considered in terms of s188(2).  
28 Grogan op cit (n1) at 290. See 3.2(c)(ii) below where I discuss the possibility of unions and 
employees incurring joint and several liability for ‘riot damage’ arising from participation in 
protest action in terms of s11 of the RGA.   
29 Section 77(4)(a). On civil contempt and contempt of court generally see Fakie NO v CCII 
Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 6-10 and 42.  
30 Section 77(2)(b)(i)-(iii). Section 77(4) similarly provides a failure to comply with such a 
declaratory order not only constitutes contempt but, in addition, results in protesters losing 
automatic protection against dismissal under s67(4) as read with s187(1)(a).  
31 Government of the Western Cape v COSATU 1998 (2) BLLR 1286 (LC). Significantly, no 
similar power is afforded to the LC, at least not expressly, in respect of a protected strike. See 
NUFBWSAW v Universal Product Network 2016 (37) ILJ 476 (LC) para 28 and 31-32.   
32 Government of the Western Cape ibid at para 32 referring to S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) 
BCLR 665 (CC) at para 140. See 2.2 of chapter two and 5.2(b)(ii) of chapter five where I 
explain what proportionality entails in practice.  
33 Ibid.  
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statutory definition in s213 of the LRA.34 Section 213 defines protest action as:  
‘the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or 
obstruction of work, for the purpose of promoting or defending the socio-
economic interests of workers, but not for a purpose referred to in the definition 
of a strike.’35 
The LRA’s definition of ‘protest action’ is substantially similar to its 
definition of a ‘strike’.36 The only, yet fundamental, distinction relates to its 
purpose.37 Specifically, the purpose of protest action must be to ‘promote or 
defend the socio-economic interests of workers’ and not, according to the 
statutory definition of a strike, to ‘remedy or resolve a dispute of mutual interest 
between employer and employee’.38  
Before explaining the meaning of purely political protest action – and 
considering whether the LRA protects it39 - it is necessary to further unpack 
two elements of the statutory definition. First, how the LRA defines strike, as 
protest action must take place for a purpose not referred to ‘in the definition of 
a strike’.40 Second, the meaning of the phrase ‘to promote or defend the socio-
economic interests of workers’.41 
(aa) ‘Not for a purpose referred to in the definition of a strike’ 
 Section 213 of the LRA defines a strike as: 
“the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or 
obstruction of work, by persons who have been employed by the same 
employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance 
or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
 
34 Benjamin & Thompson op cit (n2) at 356. Section 77(1) further states employees engaged 
in an ‘essential or maintenance service’ cannot participate in protected protest action. Whether 
this restriction complies with s17 of the Constitution is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
35 Emphasis added.   
36 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2350. 
37 Andre van Niekerk ‘Strikes and Lock-outs’ in Andre van Niekerk & Nicola Smit (eds) 
Law@Work 4 ed (2017) 461. 
38 Government of the Western Cape supra (n31) at para 32. The purpose of a strike and the 
phrase to ‘promote or defend the socio-economic interests of workers’ is discussed at 
3.1(i)(aa) and (bb) below. 
39 Specifically, whether purely political protest action falls within the statutory definition of 
protest action in s213 of the LRA. This is considered at 3.1(c)(ii) below.  
40 Per the statutory definition above.  
41 Ibid.  
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employer and employee’.42 
 This definition has four elements: (a) ‘the partial or complete concerted 
refusal to work or retardation or obstruction of work’; (b) ‘by persons who have 
been employed by the same or different employers’; (c) ‘for the purpose of 
resolving a grievance or resolving a dispute’; (d) ‘in respect of a matter of 
mutual interest between employer and employee’.43  
Element (a) is replicated, word for word, in the statutory definition of 
protest action.44 Protest action therefore takes the form of a strike – the 
concerted refusal to work – but for a different purpose: ‘to promote or defend 
the socio-economic interests of workers’.45 However, and despite clear 
connections between both forms of industrial action,46 the LAC in Business SA 
v COSATU concluded the right to protest under s77 does not derive from the 
constitutional right to strike, as it is not undertaken for the purposes of 
collective bargaining.47 The majority therefore held protest action rather 
derives from the constitutional rights to freedom of assembly and expression.48   
Leaving aside the constitutional basis for protest action,49 elements (c) 
and (d) encapsulate the statutory purpose of a strike: ‘to remedy or resolve a 
grievance or dispute in respect of a matter of mutual interest between employer 
 
42 Emphasis added.  
43 TAWUSA obo Ngedle v Unitrans Fuel and Chemical (Pty) Ltd 2016 (11) BCLR 1440 (CC) 
para 105 cited in Conradie op cit (n22) at 49. A further requirement, which does not expressly 
appear in the statutory definition, is that the demand forming the subject matter of the strike 
must be lawful. See TSI Holdings (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 2006 (7) BLLR 631 (LAC) para 48. 
44 Benjamin & Thompson op cit (n2) at 357.  
45 Van Niekerk op cit (n37).  
46 Fergus op cit (n18) at 172.  
47 Business SA v COSATU 1997 (5) BLLR 511 (LAC) 517 
48 Ibid. Contrast with the minority judgment reported separately as Business South Africa v 
COSATU 1997 (6) BLLR 681 (LAC) at 683. Nicholson JA held protest action does derive from 
the constitutional right to strike. He reasoned - correctly it is submitted - that the constitutional 
right to strike is not limited to concerted refusals to work for the purposes of collective 
bargaining alone, because s23(2)(c) of the Final Constitution, unlike 27(4) of the Interim 
Constitution, does not require strikes be undertaken solely for the ‘purposes of collective 
bargaining’. See Carole Cooper ‘Labour Relations’ in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2013) 53:48. Refer to 2.3(a)(i) of chapter two where I 
outline the principle that constitutional rights should not have implicit limitations read into them.  
49 For a detailed criticism of Business SA see Cooper ibid at 53:46-53:48. A further criticism is 
constitutional rights, especially in the labour context, often overlap and therefore protest action 
can arguably give effect to both the right to strike and freedom of assembly and expression. 
See Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC) para 52-53.  
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and employee’.50 It therefore follows that protest action undertaken for this 
purpose cannot receive statutory protection under s77 of the LRA.51  
 The LRA does not define ’dispute of mutual interest.52 The courts have 
interpreted it in the ‘widest possible sense’53 as a narrow construction would, 
effectively, circumscribe the disputes over which workers could legitimately 
strike.54 The courts have therefore interpreted ‘dispute of mutual interest’ as 
any dispute involving the creation of ‘new’ rights in the employment 
relationship55 or any matter affecting terms and conditions of employment 
between employer and employee.56 The dispute however must be between 
‘employer and employee’. This means, for instance, that an internal trade 
union dispute cannot form the subject of a protected strike.57 Similarly, a 
dispute between workers and the state, public institutions or representatives 
involving socio-economic issues would not be between ‘employer and 
employee’ and therefore cannot form the basis of a protected strike.  
(bb) ‘Promote or defend the socio-economic interests of workers’ 
The primary distinction between ‘strikes’ and ‘protest action’ concerns both the 
target and purpose of the industrial action.58 Strikes target employers to secure 
benefits or advantages for employees regarding their immediate working 
conditions: matters employers can influence or improve.59 Protest action 
targets state or public institutions to secure advantages for workers of a ‘social 
or economic nature’: matters employers may not necessarily be in a position 
 
50 On the other elements see Conradie op cit (n22).  
51 For the simple reason that the statutory definition of protest action, as above, provides that  
protest action cannot take place for ‘a purpose referred to in the definition of a strike’. See  
Government Western Cape supra (n31) at para 17.  
52 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 (5) BLLR 578 (LC) para 16. 
53 Du Toit et al op cit (n2) 388 referring to the oft cited decision of Rand Tyres & Accessories 
v Industrial Council for the Motor Industry Traansvaal 1941 TPD 108.  
54 See Alan Rycroft & Barney Jordaan A Guide to South African Labour Law 2 ed (1992) at 
169 endorsed in HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (2000) 21 ILJ 1066 
(LAC) para 11.  
55 See Vanachem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA (2014) 35 ILJ 3241 (LC) para 13. 
56 Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council v IMATU 2001 (9) BLLR 1063 (LC) para 32.  
57 Mzeuku v Volkswagen (Pty) Ltd 2001 (8) BLLR 857 (LAC) para 16-17.  
58 Giovanni Orlandi ‘Political Strikes’ in Bob Hepple, Rochelle Le Roux & Silvana Sciarra (eds) 
Laws Against Strikes: The South African Experience in an International and Comparative 
Perspective (2016)144-145.  
59 Grogan op cit (n1) at 292, Brassey op cit (n1) at A4:92. 
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to influence.60 However, drawing the line between concerted refusals to work 
over demands concerning ‘matters of mutual interest’ (strikes) versus ‘socio-
economic interests of workers’ (protest action) is easier said than done.61  
Similar to ‘mutual interest’, the LRA does not define ‘socio-economic 
interests of workers’.62 It is capable of either a wide or narrow interpretation.63 
The LAC in Business SA appeared to favour the narrow construction.64 The 
majority concluded that because LRA protest action does not derive from the 
constitutional right to strike, s77 does not necessarily require an ‘expansive or 
liberal interpretation…in the sense the exercise of the right to protest must be 
restricted as little as possible’.65 However, it is submitted that this finding turned 
upon the interpretation of the procedural requirements in s77(1)(a)-(d) of the 
LRA, not necessarily the definition of ‘protest action’ in s213.66 It is therefore 
arguably obiter. Thus, whilst persuasive, it does not necessarily constitute 
binding precedent that the substantive requirement contained in the phrase 
‘socio-economic interests of workers’ must also be narrowly construed.67 
Subsequent to Business SA, the LC considered the phrase ‘to promote 
or defend the socio-economic interests of workers’ in Government of the 
Western Cape v COSATU.68 The immediate substantive question was whether 
protest action to address disparities in public school funding in the Western 
Cape was undertaken to ‘promote or defend the socio-economic interests of 
workers’.69 The court declined to provide an ‘all-encompassing definition’.70 
 
60 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2353.  
61 See Greater Transitional Metro Council supra (n56) at para 26 where Revelas J held that 
disputes of mutual interest and socio-economic interests of workers are not mutually exclusive.  
62See Government Western Cape supra (n31) at para 15 and Iscor Refractories v NACBAWU 
1999 (3) BALR 276 (IMSSA) at 283. 
63 Le Roux & van Niekerk op cit (n2) at 85.  
64 Supra (n47) at 518. 
65 Ibid. For a further criticism of this finding see Halton Cheadle ‘Labour Relations’ in MH 
Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 
(2018) at 13:34.  
66 See Brassey op cit (n1) at A4:91-A4:92. I discuss the procedural requirements below. 
67 This is supported by Government Western Cape supra (n31) at para 20. Contrast however 
with the view expressed by John Grogan ‘Legitimate Protest: the Limits of Protection’ (1999) 
8 Employment Law Journal 13.  
68 Ibid.   
69 Ibid para 9.  
70 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2353. 
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Given the ‘elasticity of the phrase,’71 each case must depend on its own facts.72 
However, unlike Business SA, the LC relied upon the LRA’s stated purpose in 
adopting a ‘liberal interpretation’.73 Mlambo J, finding the protest fell within the 
statutory definition, held protest action will usually satisfy the substantive 
requirements for protection if workers ‘place the demand giving rise to the 
protest action within the ambit of the social status and economic position of 
workers in general’.74 This appears to require establishing a causal link 
between the protest action and ‘promoting or defending the socio-economic 
interests of workers’ for the protest to comply with the statutory definition.75  
(ii) Procedural requirements  
It is noteworthy s77(1)(a) provides that only a ‘registered trade union’ or ‘trade 
union federation’ can initiate protected protest action.76 This applies despite 
the fact s77(1) provides that every ‘employee’ has the right to protest over 
socio-economic interests affecting workers.77 The apparent purpose is to 
ensure a discernible body can be held accountable for unprotected protest 
action or protected protest action which breaches an LC declatory order 
circumscribing its duration under s77(2)(b).78  
Section 77(1)(a)-(d) stipulates four procedural requirements.79 First, as 
noted, the protest must be initiated by a registered trade union or federation.80 
Second, the union or federation must serve notice on the National Economic 
 
71 Grogan op cit (n1) at 293 
72 Government Western Cape supra (n38) at para 30.  
73 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2353. Section 1 of the LRA states its purpose ‘is to advance economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace’ 
(emphasis added). I expand on this provision further at 5.3 of chapter five. 
74 Government Western Cape supra (n38) at para 17.  
75 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2355. Establishing this link would most likely occur in terms of the 
s77(1)(b) notice served on NEDLAC. Section 77(1)(b) is discussed immediately below.   
76Section 69(1) contains a similar restriction for protected pickets. See the discussion on 
picketing at 2.4(b) of chapter two.  
77 Section 77(1). Emphasis added. Contrast with the procedural requirements for protected 
strike action under s64 which does not require the involvement of a registered trade union.  
78 Fergus op cit (n18) at 175 argues this requirement, given declining trade union membership 
in South Africa, is constitutionally suspect. However, once protected protest action has been 
initiated members of the authorising union and supporters may join it. This principle applies 
equally to protected strikes. See SATAWU v Moloto NO 2012 (6) SA 249 (CC) para 92.  
79 Government Western Cape supra (n38) at para 23.  
80 Section 77(1)(a). 
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Development and Labour Advisory Council (‘NEDLAC’) stating the reasons for, 
and nature of, the intended protest.81 Third, the issue giving rise to the protest 
must be considered by NEDLAC or ‘any other appropriate forum’82 in which 
the parties can participate to resolve the underlying dispute.83 Fourth, the union 
or federation must serve notice on NEDLAC at least 14 days before 
commencing with the protest.84 
The procedural steps must be taken sequentially: the order in which 
they appear in s77(1)(b)-(d) of the LRA.85 The s77(1)(b) notice stating the 
reasons for, and duration of the protest, is intended to afford the negotiating 
parties a proper opportunity to resolve the matter giving rise to the protest.86 
Substantial compliance is sufficent for this requirement to be met.87 Therefore, 
it is not necessary to identify every employee, or group of employees, who will 
protest.88 Section 77(1)(c) however does not stipulate the time period within 
which NEDLAC must consider the matter giving rise to the protest, but it has 
been suggested the time period must be ‘reasonable’.89 Furthermore, it is not 
necessary for negotiations to deadlock before 14 days’ notice to protest under 
s77(d) can be given, but NEDLAC or ‘any other appropriate forum’ must still 
properly consider the underlying dispute.90 A ‘cosmetic consideration’ is 
therefore insufficient.91 The notice to commence protesting should also only 
be given once it is clear the other negotiating party sees ‘no scope for resolving 
 
81 Section 77(1)(b)(i)-(ii).  
82 Brassey op cit (n1) at A4:95 argues however that this provision creates more problems than 
it solves, given the s77(1)(d) notice must be served on NEDLAC to commence with a protected 
protest, not the ‘other appropriate forum’. Practically, NEDLAC must therefore play a role 
regardless of whether another forum is involved or not.  
83 Section 77(1)(c).  
84 Section 77(1)(d). 
85 Business SA supra (n47) at 523. 
86 Ibid at 524.  
87 Ibid. On substantial compliance see ACDP v IEC 2006 (5) BCLR 579 (CC) para 24-25.  
88 Fergus op cit (n18) at 175 citing Moloto NO supra (n79) at para 88-92.  
89 Ibid. Brassey op cit (n1) at A4:93 conversely argues implicitly reading in a ‘reasonable time’ 
requirement is nonsensical because s77(1)(c) provides it is a procedural pre-requisite for the 
dispute to  properly ‘considered’ before protected protest action can take place.  
90 Government Western Cape supra (n38) at para 26.  
91 Fergus op cit (n18) at 175 citing Government Western Cape supra (n31) at para 28.  
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the dispute’.92 Finally, the 14 day advance notice to commence protesting 
should be given to NEDLAC in terms of LRA form 4.5.93 However, failure to 
give notice in terms of LRA form 4.5 is not fatal, provided the alternative notice 
substantially complies with the requirements of s77(1)(d).94 
(c) Purely political protest action  
(i) What is purely political protest action?  
There exists no universally accepted legal definition of ‘purely political’ protest 
action.95 Kahn Freund argues it is neither possible, nor desirable, to attempt a 
precise definition.96 This is because the term ‘political’ is itself a contested 
concept.97 It has ‘no universally accepted definition’ and is therefore incapable 
‘of a precise definition prescribed by law.’98  
 Nevertheless, working definitions of ‘purely political’ protest action - or 
‘purely political strike action’ - have been attempted. In Sheard v AEUW, an 
English Appeal Court decision, the court cautioned against a precise definition, 
but nevertheless held a purely political strike is one undertaken to ‘pursue a 
policy in opposition to the government in power’.99 Cassim, drawing on 
Sherard, defines purely political protest action as one, ‘directed against the 
government or any other public authority’.100 Fikentscher, adopts a similar 
definition, arguing that political strikes involve, ‘the exertion of pressure against 
officials…the representatives of the power vested in the state and its 
authorities’.101 Nadasen further proposes that a defining characteristic of 
 
92 Business SA supra (n47) at 528. Brassey op cit (n1) at A4:95 likens the requirement to 
‘consider the dispute’ as requiring NEDLAC, or the other appropriate forum, to properly apply 
its mind to the dispute.  
93 Fergus op cit (n18) at 176.  
94 Business SA supra (n47) at 525.  
95 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2354. The ILO refers uses the phrase ‘political strike action’ as opposed 
to ‘political protest action’. I utilise both phrases synonymously.  
96 Paul Davis & Mark Freedland Khan Freund’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 315. 
97 Ibid. See also Andrew Heywood Politics 3 ed (2007) 4-19 who explains how political 
scientists themselves cannot agree on a universally accepted definition of the term ‘political’. 
98 Davis & Freedland ibid at 316.  
99 Sheard v Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [1973] ICR 421 at 429-428 cited in 
Cassim op cit (n5) at 2356.  
100 Ibid.  
101 Wolfgang Fikentscher ‘Political Strikes under German Law’ (1953) 5 The American Journal 
of Comparative Law 72 
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purely political strike action is where strikers ‘act not only in [their] capacity as 
workers, but equally in [their] role as citizens’.102  
In this sense, and similar to socio-economic protest action, the demand 
is directed at public institutions or government,  not  the workers’ employer who 
is not necessarily in a position to accede to the demand giving rise to the 
protest.103 Similarly, as Novitz identifies, political strikes encompass a wide 
range of objectives from: aiming to depose the government; reducing its 
credibility and attempting to influence (or ‘dictate’) broader policy decisions.104 
Historical examples include strikes (or protests) to: oppose a declaration of 
war, support a presidential candidate105 and technicians refusing to transmit a 
football match to South Africa in opposition towards Apartheid policy.106 
 However, just as strikes over disputes of mutual interest often 
‘intertwine with socio-economic demands’, protest action over a ‘purely 
political’ issue may equally intertwine with socio-economic demands as well as 
demands concerning disputes of mutual interest.107 Thus, it is necessary to 
examine if the LRA protects protest action involving: (a) purely political issues 
unrelated to workers socio-economic interests;108 (b) socio-economic and 
industrial demands; and (c) political and socio-economic demands.109 I 
consider this immediately below.  
(ii) Does the LRA protect purely political protest action? 
No binding authority exists regarding whether the LRA permits purely political 
protest action. Equally, for the same reason, no binding authority exists 
regarding whether the failure to protect purely political protest action would 
limit the constitutional right of employees to freedom of assembly, let alone if 
 
102 Sagie Nadasen ‘”Strike for the purpose of collective bargaining…” – The Place of the 
Political Strike in a Democracy’ (1997) 11 TSAR 122.   
103 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2356. See also NUMSA v The Benicon Group 1997 (18) ILJ 123 
(LAC) at 124F-G.  
104 Tania Novitz International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (2003) 295.  
105 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2356.  
106 See British Broadcasting Corporation v Hearn [1977] 1 WLR 1004 discussed in Cassim ibid 
at 2357.  
107 Cassim ibid at 2356-2357.  
108 This can be defined as purely political protest action proper.  
109 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2358.  
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this would be justifiable in terms of s36(1) of the Constitution.  
 The academic position, overwhelmingly, holds the statutory definition 
does not encompass protest action concerning purely political issues.110 The 
common premise rests on the fact that while the CFA regards socio-economic 
strikes as protected by international principles of freedom of association,111 
strikes of a ‘purely political nature’ are not protected by these same 
principles.112 Novitz contends the primary basis upon which the CFA takes this 
position, is because it views ‘purely political’ strikes as ‘disruptive of the 
democratic process’.113 However, the CFA has acknowledged practical 
difficulties in distinguishing between ‘purely political’ protests’ (or strikes) 
versus ‘socio-economic’ strikes,114 as both ‘notions overlap’.115 However, 
where protest action involves both ‘political’ and ‘socio-economic’ demands, 
the CFA holds the strike should be protected, provided it is not used as a 
pretext to pursue political objectives ‘unconnected with defending or furthering 
workers interests’.116 
 The academic position has merit for at least two interconnected 
reasons. First, s233 of the Constitution requires courts to prefer any 
‘reasonable interpretation’ of legislation which is inconsistent with international 
law over any alternative inconsistent interpretation.117 Second, s3(c) of the 
LRA requires interpreting it consistently ‘with the Republic’s public international 
law obligations’.118 For both reasons, both CFA and ILO Committee of Experts 
opinions significantly influence how our courts interpret both the LRA119 and 
 
110 See Grogan op cit (n1) at 412, Brassey op cit (n1) at A4:91 and van Niekerk op cit (n37). 
111 Freedom of Association Digest op cit (n12) at para 481. For a summary of the academic 
position see Cassim op cit (n5) at 2359.  
112 Digest ibid para 327. See further Aeberhard & De Dios op cit (n15) at 548-549.  
113 Novitz op cit (n105) at 56. I consider an opposing view at 5.3 of chapter five.  
114 Digest op cit (n12) at para 527. See also Gernigon, Odero & Guido op cit (n14) at 445-446.  
115 Digest ibid at para 359.  
116 Ibid at para 357 and 412 discussed in Aeberhard & de Dios op cit (n15) at 549.  
117 See Kaunda v President RSA 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) para 33.  
118 Section 1(b) similarly states a fundamental LRA object is to ‘give effect to obligations 
incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour Organisation’.  
119See for instance POPCRU v SACOSWU 2019 (1) SA 73 (CC) para 89-97, Discovery Health 
v CCMA (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC) para 41-47 and NEHAWU v UCT 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 
34 and 41.  
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the fundamental labour rights in s23 of the Constitution.120 Whilst not legally 
binding,121 the views of both ILO supervisory bodies do bear significant 
weight.122 The CFA view, that purely political strikes are unprotected, would 
therefore bear significant pull were a court called upon to determine whether 
the LRA prohibits purely political protest action.  
The CFA, however, as above, views protest action involving both 
political and socio-economic demands as protected by the principle of freedom 
of association.123 On this basis, one can make two arguments, both, it is 
submitted, are compatible with the CFA and ILO Committee of Experts 
position. First, LRA protest action involving both political and socio-economic 
demands should be encompassed by the statutory definition, when not used 
as a pretext to pursue purely political demands unrelated to workers socio-
economic interests.124 Second, and for the same reason, strikes (not protest 
action), which involves both socio-economic demands and demands of mutual 
interest should be capable of protection.125 However, the more immediate 
issue is whether purely political protest action - involving neither socio-
economic or industrial demands – can fall within the statutory definition?  
The academic position, and despite the above, is flawed to the extent it 
proposes simply because the CFA views purely political protest action as 
unprotected it equally, and necessarily, follows that LRA purely political protest 
action is prohibited. As noted, ILO supervisory body opinions, whilst 
persuasive, are not binding.126 Similar to the duty to ‘consider’ international law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights, courts are not inflexibly bound to interpret 
 
120 See NUMSA v Bader Bop 2003 (3) SA 513 (CC) para 25-36, SANDU v Minister of Defence 
2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) para 84. 
121 Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd v Brand NO 2001 (22) ILJ 933 (LC) para 67.  
122 See Halton Cheadle ‘Reception of International Labour Standards in common-law legal 
systems’ (2012) 14 Acta Juridica 348, Andre van Niekerk ‘International Labour Standards’ in 
Andre van Niekerk & Nicola Smit (eds) Law@Work 4 ed (2017) 31-34 and FAWU v Pets 
Products (Pty) Ltd 2000 (7) BLLR 781 (LC) para 14. 
123Digest op cit (n12) at para 357 and 412.   
124 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2364.  
125 Ibid referring to Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro Council supra (n56) at para 24-
32 where Revelas J found a strike to be protected which involved both socio-economic 
demands and demands in respect of a dispute of mutual interest.  
126 Volkswagen SA supra (n121).  
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the LRA consistently with opinions held by ILO supervisory bodies in every 
instance.127 Thus, an express departure, it is submitted, would be justified were 
it necessary to avoid an interpretation of the LRA that would limit a 
constitutional right.128 Furthermore, ILO supervisory body opinions are, by their 
nature, abstract and general and therefore cannot necessarily take account of 
particular circumstances in specific jurisdictions.129 Whether the LRA protects 
(or should protect) purely political protest action should also be considered 
within the South African context and the framework of the Bill of Rights.130  
To this extent, whether purely political protest action is permitted, 
depends on how broadly or narrowly one interprets ‘to defend or promote the 
socio-economic interests of workers’.131 It is difficult to determine in the 
abstract whether purely political protest is permitted, as each case is fact 
specific.132 However, a narrow (or literal) interpretation would not, it is 
submitted, support the conclusion that purely political protest is permitted. The 
phrase ‘socio-economic interests of workers’ must be assumed to have been 
used intentionally, in part, to exclude workers from utilising s77 of the LRA to 
protest over matters not affecting their ‘socio-economic interests’.133 A broad 
interpretation could result in the conclusion, per above, that protest action 
involving both political and socio-economic matters is protected. However, 
even broadly interpreted, a purely political matter, for instance, a decision to 
appoint a corrupt politician to the cabinet or host a foreign diplomat accused of 
genocide, would arguably not affect the ‘socio-economic interests’ of workers. 
Pursuant to ‘reading down’, interpreting the definition to include such matters 
would prevent a finding that the statutory definition limits the right of employees 
to freedom of assembly.134 The fundamental problem is ‘socio-economic 
 
127 See the discussion on s39(1)(b) of the Constitution at 2.3(a)(ii) of chapter two.  
128 See the discussion on reading down at 2.3(b)(i) of chapter two.  
129 See Benjamin & Saley op cit (n10) at 751 
130 Ibid.  
131 Cassim op cit (n5) at 2364.  
132 Government Western Cape supra (n31) at para 30.  
133 See Grogan op cit (n1) at 202 who argues ‘the words “socio-economic” seems to have 
been intended to exclude stayaways with a purely party-political objective” (emphasis added). 
Similar reasoning underpins the words ‘dispute of mutual interest’ in the statutory definition of 
a strike. See Vanachem Vanadium Products supra (n55) at para 17.   
134 See the discussion on reading down at 2.3(b)(i) of chapter two. 
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interests of workers’ is not reasonably capable of an interpretation which would 
necessarily include political matters within its ambit.135 Such an interpretation 
would thus go beyond the restraints imposed upon the reading down principle. 
On this basis, a literal interpretation would not protect purely political 
protest action. A generous (or liberal) interpretation may protect protests 
involving both socio-economic and political matters but interpreting ‘socio-
economic interests’ to necessarily include “purely political” matters (or 
demands) would stretch the concept too far and be unduly strained. The 
statutory definition therefore cannot protect purely political protest action. This, 
in turn, limits the right of employees to freedom of assembly as it prevents 
them from manifesting opposition, or support, for causes of importance to them 
which do not necessarily affect their socio-economic interests.136 Furthermore, 
it therefore follows, it is submitted, that this prohibition also infringes their rights 
to freedom of expression, association and dignity, all of which are intricately 
linked to the right to free assembly.137 Whether this limitation can be justified 
in terms of s36 of the Constitution, is considered in chapter five.  
3.2. THE RGA AND GATHERINGS  
(a) Background  
Historically, as demonstrated, South African workers have not confined 
themselves to pursuing industrial demands alone.138 Under the constitutional 
dispensation, workers continue to protest and demonstrate as a means to 
pursue broader socio-economic (and political) demands both within their 
 
135 See Bertie van Zyl (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (2) SA 181 (CC) at para 
23 where Mokgoro J held the constitutionally compliant interpretation cannot be ‘far-fetched’. 
136 See 2.4(a) of chapter two where this aspect of the content of the right is discussed.  
137 See S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) para 50, SANDU supra (n120) at para 7-8, Hotz 
v UCT (2016) 4 SA 723 (SCA) para 62 as well as 2.4(a) of chapter two where the intrinsic 
interconnection between freedom of assembly and these other rights is explained. See further 
Business SA supra (n47) at 489:J-489A where the LAC recognised that protest action is 
underpinned by the constitutional rights to freedom of assembly and expression and Cassim 
op cit (n5) at 2365-2366. I further expand on this theme at 5.3 of chapter five.  
138 Fergus op cit (n18) at 151. 
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communities and society generally.139  
 Aside from LRA socio-economic protest action workers can utilise the 
RGA, the principal statute which gives effect to the right to freedom of 
assembly outside the labour sphere,140 as a mechanism to express opposition 
towards (or support for) a particular cause.141 In this sense, LRA socio-
economic protest action and RGA demonstrations and assemblies often 
pursue indistinguishable objectives.142 The distinction drawn between LRA 
socio-economic protest action and RGA demonstrations is therefore a ‘purely 
legal’ one.143 While both regulate freedom of assembly, albeit in different ways, 
they do prescribe different requirements to lawfully protest or assemble 
respectively.144 However, one important distinction is the RGA does not 
circumscribe the matters over which workers can assemble and demonstrate 
- unlike s77 of the LRA.145 Therefore, nothing prevents workers from pursuing 
socio-economic demands or purely political demands under the RGA to the 
exclusion of the LRA. Whether workers elect to rely upon s77 of the LRA to 
pursue socio-economic demands, or the RGA, is therefore a tactical choice to 
made in the circumstances of each case.146 However, whether workers can 
use the RGA, to the exclusion of the LRA, to assemble over a dispute of mutual 
interest is less certain, something I consider in the following chapter.147 
 
139 See Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, ‘Strike law, structural violence and inequality in the platinum 
hills of Marikana’ (2013) 34 ILJ 840 and Mario Jacobs ‘The socio-economic dimension of 
strikes’ in Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 42-44.  
140 See Tsoaeli v S 2018 (1) SACR 42 (FB) para 11 and SATAWU v Garvis SATAWU 2013 
(1) SA 83 (CC) para 55. See 2.3(b)(i) of chapter two.  
141 See Dennis Davis ‘Assembly’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2018) 12:2.  
142Fergus op cit (n18) at 179. For instance: an RGA assembly over poor service delivery, lack 
of housing or poor schooling would equally implicate the ‘socio-economic interests of workers’ 
thereby providing grounds for socio-economic protest action under s77 of the LRA.  
143 Ibid at 155. 
144 Ibid.  
145 However, workers who engage in RGA assemblies, and not LRA socio-economic protest 
action, will not benefit from the protections in terms of s77(3) as read with s67 of the LRA. 
Furthermore, as a result, workers who absent themselves from work without valid cause to 
participate in an RGA demonstration commit misconduct (absenteeism) and can be disciplined 
or potentially dismissed. Nothing of course would prevent them from engaging in RGA 
demonstrations and gatherings outside working hours.  
146 Fergus op cit (n18) at 155.  
147 Where ADT Security v NASUWU 2015 (36) ILJ 152 (LAC) is discussed. 
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 Before considering overlaps between both statutes in the labour 
context, and how the RGA limits workers’ rights to assemble, I discuss how 
the RGA distinguishes between ‘demonstrations’ and ‘gatherings’.  
(b) ‘Demonstrations’ versus ‘gatherings’  
The RGA regulates two forms of assembly: ‘demonstrations’ and ‘gatherings’. 
The primary distinction solely turns on the number of participants.148 
‘Demonstration’ is defined as: ‘any demonstration by one or more persons, but 
not more than 15 persons, for or against any person, cause, action or failure 
to take action.’149 ‘Gathering’ is  defined: ‘as any assembly, concourse or 
procession of more than 15 persons…on any public road defined in the Road 
Traffic Act…or any other place or premises wholly or partly open to the air’.150  
It is not immediately clear why ’15 persons’ was decided as the basis 
on which to distinguish between ‘gatherings’ versus ‘demonstrations’.151 
Regardless, the distinction is not semantic. The RGA imposes more stringent 
regulations, and limitations, upon gatherings than it does demonstrations. Two 
such limitations are considered immediately below: the s3 ‘notice requirement’ 
and the s11 provisions providing for joint and several liability for ‘riot damage’. 
(c) RGA restrictions on freedom of assembly  
(i) The notice requirement 
A detailed discussion of the notice requirement is unnecessary for present 
purposes.152 However, a brief discussion is required to set the background for 
the discussion of ADT Security v NASUWU in the following chapter.153 
Section 3(1) requires the gathering convenor to give seven days 
 
148Stuart Woolman ‘Freedom of Assembly’ in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2013) 43:22.  
149Emphasis added.  
150Emphasis added. This is an abbreviated definition from Tsoaeli supra (n141) at para 12.  
151See Pierre de Vos ‘Political and Process Rights’ in Pierre De Vos & Warren Freedman (eds) 
South African Constitutional Law in Context (2013) 553 who argues distinguishing between 
gatherings purely on the basis of size is arbitrary and therefore raises questions about the 
constitutionality of this provision. The arbitrariness of the distinction was considered, but not 
decided, by the High Court in Mlungwana v S  2018 (2) All SA 183 (WCC) para 94.  
152 For a detailed discussion see Mlungwana v S 2019 (1) BCLR 88 (CC) para 7-23.  
153 Supra (n147).  
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advance notice to the RGA responsible officer. No similar notice requirement 
is required for demonstrations.154 If seven days advance notice cannot be 
provided, at least 48 hours’ notice must be provided.155 However, where only 
48 hours’ notice is provided, the responsible officer can prohibit the gathering 
on notice.156 Once the notice is received, the officer can conduct negotiations 
to determine how the gathering will take place.157 Section 12(1)(a) however 
provides it is an offence to convene a gathering where no notice is provided or 
where insufficient notice is provided. The only defence appears in s12(2): 
where the convenor can establish the gathering ‘took place spontaneously’. 
 Criminalising failure to give notice, or inadequate notice, clearly 
discourages people from exercising the right to assembly thereby imposing 
drastic limitations upon its exercise. In S v Mlungwana, the CC thus, and 
unsurprisingly, struck down s12(1)(a) as an unjustifiable limitation on freedom 
of assembly.158 Worker protests under the RGA, which qualify as gatherings, 
therefore no longer face the possibility of criminal sanctions if no advance 
notice is given to the local authorities. However, per Mlungwana, they may still 
face the possibility of administrative fines if no advance notice is provided.159 
(ii) Joint and several liability for riot damage  
Section 11 is perhaps the RGA’s most controversial provision.160 Section 11(1) 
states that the convenor, participants or any organisation which holds a 
gathering are jointly and severally liable for any ‘riot damage’ it causes.161 
Section 1 defines ‘riot damage’ as:  
‘any loss suffered as a result of any injury to or the death of any person, or any 
damage to or destruction of any property, caused directly or indirectly by, and 
 
154 Mlungwana supra (n153) at para 10.  
155 Section 3(2).  
156 Section 3(2).  
157 Section 4(1).  
158 Mlungwana supra (n153) at para 2. See further Davis op cit (n141) at 12:8.   
159 Ibid at para 99-101. Technically, this issue was left open by the CC but appears to have 
been endorsed by the High Court in the same matter, Mlungwana supra (n152).  
160See De Vos op cit (n151) at 556-558. Similar to the discussion on the notice requirement, 
only a brief discussion is necessary for present purposes.  
161 Section 11(4) however provides that s11(1) does not abolish the right of those who suffer 
harm during a gathering to institute common law delictual claims.  
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immediately before, during or after, the holding of a gathering’. 
Section 11(1)(a) creates a form of strict statutory vicarious liability.162 
This is because the convenor, participants or organisation – which could a  
union163 - are jointly and severally liable if the s11(1)(a) elements are 
established.164 Section 11(2) provides a defence where the convenor or 
organisation establishes: (a) they did not permit any act or omission causing 
riot damage; (b) the act or omission did not ‘fall within the scope of the 
objectives of the gathering’ and was ‘not reasonably foreseeable’; and (c) all 
‘reasonable steps’ were taken to prevent any act or omission causing riot 
damage.165 
Section 11(1) significantly increases the potential costs of organising 
gatherings which may discourage workers from exercising the right to 
assemble under the RGA.166 Furthermore, establishing the s11(2) defence, to 
avoid the imposition of strict liability, is difficult in practice, as organisations 
must continuously take ‘all reasonable steps’ to prevent any riot damage which 
is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ and which is ‘caused directly or indirectly’ both 
‘before, during [and] after the gathering’.167 It is therefore unsurprising, s11(2) 
was similarly subjected to constitutional challenge in SATAWU v Garvis.168  
In Garvis, the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union 
(‘SATAWU’), during the course of a protected strike,169 organised a gathering 
in the City of Cape Town that turned violent resulting in millions of rands worth 
 
162Adolph Landman ‘No Place to Hide – A Trade Union’s Liability for Riot Damage: A Note on 
Garvis & Others v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (Minister for Safety & Security, Third 
Party)’ (2011) 31 ILJ 838. On vicarious liability generally, see Johan Neethling & Johan 
Potgieter Visser: Law of Delict 7 ed (2015) 389-399.  
163 See Malcom Wallis ‘Now you Foresee It, Now You Don’t – SATAWU v Garvis & Others’ 
(2012) 33 ILJ 2259 who notes the RGA only applies to public assemblies. However, strikes, 
and more specifically pickets, can take place in a public space potentially opening up unions 
to liability. See 2.4(b) of chapter two.  
164 Landman op cit (n162) at 846 notes the fact that because s11(1) provides for strict liability, 
it does incentivise reliance upon s11(1), because it abrogates the need to establish fault, an 
essential element for delictual liability. See Neethling & Potgieter op cit (n163) at 129.  
165 Section 11(2)(a)-(c).  
166 Wallis op cit (n163) at 2250. 
167 See Stuart Woolman ‘You Break it, You Own It: South African Assembly Jurisprudence 
After Garvis’ (2015) 9 Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law 557-560.  
168 SATAWU v Garvis 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC). 
169 Ibid para 10. See 4.4(b)(ii) of chapter four where the relevance of this fact is discussed.  
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of riot damage.170 When faced with s11(1) liability, SATAWU mounted a 
constitutional challenge against the s11(2) defence contending it was irrational 
on the basis there was no realistic way for an organisation to establish its three 
elements which, in turn, meant s11(1) liability would in essence almost always 
be a foregone conclusion.171 However, unlike Mlungwana,172 the CC upheld 
s11(2) as rational and constitutional.173 While Moegeng CJ held s11(2) limited 
the right to free assembly, he found the limitation to be both rational and 
justifiable under s36(1) of the Constitution.174 Needless to say, Garvis has 
been subjected to varying degrees of criticism175 and a detailed analysis is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. For present purposes, it is important to keep 
in mind that unions, and their members, must always be alive to the possibility 
of joint and several s11(1) liability for ‘riot damage’ when organising 
gatherings,176 or even LRA protest action, which may turn awry.177 
3.3. CONCLUSION  
This chapter had two objectives. First, to demonstrate how s77 as read with 
the definition of ‘protest action’ in s213 of the LRA cannot protect purely 
political protests which, in turn, limits the constitutional right of workers to free 
assembly. Second, to outline how the RGA regulates, and limits, the right of 
workers to assemble and demonstrate - both generally and in the context of 
socio-economic protest action and picketing. The next chapter establishes the 
second limitation. How the LRA limits the constitutional right of employees to 
assemble in compliance with the RGA, by prohibiting gatherings over disputes 
of mutual interest, a limitation that flows from the LAC decision in ADT Security 
v NASUWU.178 
 
170 Ibid para 12.  
171 Ibid para 16-17.  
172 Supra (n153) at para 2.  
173 Supra (n169) at para 40 and 84.  
174 Ibid para 84.  
175 See Woolman op cit (n167), Davis op cit (n141) and Wallis op cit (n163) at 2262.  
176 Landman op cit (n162) at 846. 
177 Orlandi op cit (n58) at 145-146. However, it is important to note unions are only obligated 
to take ‘reasonable steps’ within their power to prevent to riot damage. See Garvis supra 
(n168) at para 45 and KPMM Road and Earthworks v AMCU (2018) 39 ILJ 609 (LC) para 54. 
178 Supra (n147).  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
ADT SECURITY V NASUWU: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HOW 
THE LRA LIMITS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
EMPLOYEES TO ASSEMBLE UNDER THE RGA  
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
The LC1 and LAC2 in ADT Security v NASUWU (‘ADT Security’) had to 
determine the following (implicit) question: does the LRA limit the constitutional 
right of off-duty employees to assemble under the RGA over disputes over 
mutual interest?3 The LC held the LRA does not limit this right, as the workers 
in question expressly disavowed all reliance on their LRA rights and remedies 
and fully complied with the RGA requirements.4 On appeal, the LAC 
unanimously held otherwise.5 While the LAC did not directly address whether 
the LRA limits the constitutional right of employees to assemble under the RGA 
- or whether this is justifiable6 - it held it would be contrary to public policy, and 
therefore unlawful, to allow employees to use the RGA to protest over 
workplace disputes to the exclusion of the LRA.7  
 While the LAC did not directly address the issue, the result is the same. 
The LRA limits the constitutional right of employees to assemble and picket in 
compliance with the RGA over workplace disputes without first utilising the 
LRA.8 However, as I argue below, this holding does not prevent workers from 
using RGA assemblies in conjunction with LRA protected strike action to 
 
1 ADT Security (Pty) Ltd v NASUWU 2012 (33) ILJ 575 (LC) 
2 ADT Security (Pty) Ltd v NASUWU 2015 (36) ILJ 152 (LAC) 
3 Ibid para 12. I explain why this question was implicit at 4.2(b) below. For a useful summary, 
see John Grogan ‘Labour Law’ Annual Survey of South African Law (2014) 731-732. On the 
meaning of the phrase ‘dispute of mutual interest’ see 3.1(b)(i) of chapter three. 
4 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 10-12. See 3.2(c)(i) of chapter three on what the RGA 
requirements for demonstrations and gatherings respectively entail.  
5 ADT Security Supra (n2) at para 32.  
6 Ibid para 30. I consider this question in the following chapter.  
7 Ibid para 15 and 30.  
8 See Darcy du Toit ‘The right to equality versus employer ‘control’ and employee 
‘insubordination’: Are some more equal than others?’ (2016) 37 ILJ 21-23. On picketing 
outside the ambit of s69 of the LRA see 2.4(b) of chapter two and Halton Cheadle ‘Labour 
Relations’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The 
Bill of Rights (2018) 18:23-18:25.  
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influence the outcome of workplace disputes.9 First, I outline the background 
facts and legal issues. Second, I contrast the LC and LAC reasoning. Here, I 
illustrate, while the LAC judgment stands, it is undeniable that the LRA limits 
the constitutional right of employees to assemble under the RGA.10 Finally, I 
consider three separate criticisms of the LAC’s decision: (a) whether it was 
possible to apply ‘reading down’ to avoid the limitation;11 (b) whether it conflicts 
with the CC’s decision in SATAWU v Garvis;12 and (c) whether it conflicts with 
the constitutional right of trade unions to engage in collective bargaining.13 
4.2. BACKGROUND  
(a) Facts 
The National Security and Unqualified Workers Union (‘NASUWU’ or ‘the 
union’) was a minority union in the workplace14 of ADT Security (Pty) Ltd 
(‘ADT’).15 NASUWU asked ADT to extend it organisational rights under  
Chapter III of the LRA.16 ADT refused as NASUWU lacked sufficent levels of 
representativeness to validate the rights it wished to exercise.17 NASUWU 
could have referred a dispute to the CCMA for conciliation under s22 of the 
LRA and embarked on protected strike action under Chapter IV of the LRA18 
 
9 See the discussion of SATAWU v Garvis 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC) at 4.4(b) below.  
10 Du Toit op cit (n8), Emma Fergus ‘Pickets, socio-economic protest action, gatherings and 
demonstrations’ in Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 182-183. 
11 I briefly recap what ‘reading down’ entails below at 4.4(a). See 2.3(b)(i) of chapter two for a 
more in-depth discussion.   
12 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC). See Fergus op cit (n10).  
13 Section 23(5) of the Bill of Rights states ‘every trade union, employer and employer’s 
organisation has the right to engage in collective bargaining’. I consider its three contours at 
4.4(c) below. See Cheadle ibid for an overview. Du Toit op cit (n8) raises the further argument, 
if the LAC decision is correct, that the LRA also limits the constitutional right to equality in s9(3) 
of the Constitution. This criticism, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
14 On the statutory definition of ‘workplace’ in s213 of the LRA, see AMCU v Chamber of Mines 
2017 (3) SA 242 (CC) para 24-32.  
15 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 7.  
16 Ibid. On organisational rights generally see Darcy du Toit, Shane Godfrey & Carole Cooper 
et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 6 ed (2014) 250-266.  
17 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 7. Namely, rights only majority unions are statutorily entitled 
to which appear in s14-16 of the LRA.  
18 On the procedural and substantive requirements for protected strike action see Du Toit et al 
ibid at 334-354. See 3.1(b) of chapter three on the protections it attracts.  
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to compel ADT to grant it organisational rights.19 NASUWU did neither of these 
things.20  
Instead, it expressly disavowed all reliance on its LRA rights and 
successfully applied to the City of Cape Town (‘the City’) in terms of s3 of the 
RGA to hold a gathering and picket outside ADT’s head office in support of its 
demand for organisational rights under the LRA.21 An agreement under s4(4) 
of the RGA was concluded between NASUWU and the RGA responsible 
officer which provided that: local police and traffic services would monitor the 
gathering, participants would remain unarmed and unmasked for its duration 
and NASUWU would appoint marshals to monitor it.22 During the picket, 
NASUWU would hand a memorandum of their demands to ADT management 
which were ‘not limited to LRA issues alone’.23 When ADT became aware of 
the proposed gathering it applied to the LC, on an urgent basis, for a final 
interdict restraining NASUWU from proceeding with the gathering and picket.24 
(b) Legal issues 
Both courts considered two issues. First, does the LC have jurisdiction to 
interdict a gathering?25 Second, if yes, were the three requirements for a final 
interdict established?26  
 Because NASUWU fully complied with the RGA, ADT could not interdict 
the gathering for lack of compliance with that statute.27 ADT therefore argued 
two alternative grounds. First, the LRA prohibits employees from utilising the 
RGA as an alternative mechanism to influence the outcome of collective 
 
19 Grogan op cit (n3) at 732. On the right of minority unions to strike over organisational rights 
to which they are not statutorily entitled, in terms of s20 of the LRA, see NUMSA v Bader Bop 
2003 (3) SA 513 (CC) para 41-45.  
20 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 8.  
21 Ibid. See 3.2(c)(i) of chapter three on the s3 RGA notice requirement.  
22 Ibid.  
23 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 15. I expand further on the significance of this fact in 
particular at 4.3(b)(i) below.  
24 Ibid para 7.  
25 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 11.1.  
26 Ibid para 11.2. Namely: (a) a clear right; (b) a reasonable apprehension of harm; and (c) 
absence of an alternative remedy. I discuss how ADT sought to establish these three elements 
below. See generally Hotz v UCT 2017 (2) SA 485 (SCA) para 29 and 35-36.  
27 Du Toit op cit (n8) at 21-22. 
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bargaining, as this would unlawfully circumvent the LRA and because the RGA 
conflicts with the LRA insofar as disputes of mutual interest are concerned.28 
Second, alternatively, employee participation would breach the implied 
contractual duty of good faith, constituting common law misconduct, as it would 
directly and adversely affect ADT’s reputation and goodwill.29 Implicit in the 
first argument, was whether the LRA limits the constitutional right of employees 
to assemble in compliance with the RGA.30  If correct, the LRA would limit this 
right by preventing off-duty employees from protesting under the RGA over a 
workplace dispute, despite fully complying with the RGA’s requirements.31 
4.3. CONTRASTING THE REASONING  
(a) Does the Labour Court have jurisdiction?  
(i) Labour Court  
Steenkamp J concluded that despite the fact neither the LRA or RGA expressly 
give the LC jurisdiction to interdict a RGA gathering, the LC had jurisdiction to 
entertain ADT’s application.32 
 Whilst not expressly articulated, the LC appeared to source jurisdiction 
in s157(2)(a) of the LRA.33 Three decisions were cited to find jurisdiction:34 
Makhanya v University of Zululand,35 Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security36 
and South African Maritime Authority v McKenzie.37 All three, it is submitted, 
 
28 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 11.2 and para 14-16. ADT primarily relied upon s210 and 
s22 of the LRA in support of this contention. I expand on both provisions at 4.3(b)(ii) below. 
29 Ibid para 31. I discuss the contractual duty of good faith below at 4.3(c). For an overview 
see Craig Bosch ‘The Implied Term of Trust and Confidence in South African Labour Law’ 
(2006) 27 ILJ 28 and CSIR v Fijien 1996 (2) SA 1 (SCA) para 18. On the distinction between 
‘tacit’ versus ‘implied’ contractual terms see Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Traansvaal 
Provincial Administration 1974 (SA) 506 (A) at 531. 
30 See Grogan op cit (n3) at 732.  
31 See the discussion of Mlungwana v S 2019 (1) BCLR 88 (CC) at 2.4(a) of chapter two where 
Petse AJ held at para 43 that any law which ‘would prevent unarmed persons from assembling 
peacefully would the right in section 17 [of the Bill of Rights]’. 
32 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 6.  
33 Section 157(2)(a) provides that the LC has concurrent jurisdiction with the HC to determine 
any alleged or threatened violation of a constitutional right ‘arising from employment and 
labour relations’.  
34 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 2-5.  
35 2009 (30) ILJ 1539 (SCA). 
36 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC).  
37 2010 (3) SA 601 (SCA). 
47 
 
largely articulate the same two principles. First, the LRA does not fully 
encapsulate all the rights employees enjoy.38 Second, depending on the claim, 
a single forum may have exclusive jurisdiction, or multiple forums concurrent 
jurisdiction, to enforce claims arising from the employment relationship.39  
Broadly, three claims may ‘potentially’ arise.40 First, claims arising from 
the ‘LRA rights’.41 Second, claims arising from ‘general law’ such as damages 
or specific performance arising from an unlawful termination of an employment 
contract.42 Third, constitutional claims, arising from, for instance, the right to 
just administrative action as given effect to by the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’).43 The LC and CCMA have exclusive jurisdiction 
to enforce ‘LRA rights’. The LC and High Court (‘HC’) concurrent jurisdiction to 
enforce contractual claims: the HC under its inherent common law jurisdiction44 
and the LC in terms of s77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997 (‘BCEA’).45 Finally, the LC and HC enjoy concurrent jurisdiction to 
enforce constitutional rights: the HC in terms of s169(1)(a) of the Constitution 
and LC in terms of s157(2)(a) of the LRA.46 It is therefore, not ‘unusual’ for an 
employee to assert one more claims arising from the same facts, which 
depending on the nature of the claim, may be enforceable in multiple forums.47 
 Applying these principles, Steenkamp J appeared to reason as follows. 
Because the RGA gives effect to s17 of the Constitution, and because the 
 
38 This principle was first articulated in Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 (2) SA 295 
(SCA) para 11-12 and 21-22, later reiterated in Makhanya supra (n35) at para 8 and 11, Gcaba 
supra (n36) at para 73 and subsequently McKenzie supra (n37) at para 7.  
39 Makhanya ibid para 11-15, Gcaba ibid para 42 and 52. See also Fredericks v MEC for 
Education Eastern Cape 2002 (2) SA 693 (CC) para 38 citing Wolfaardt ibid at para 25. It is 
important to note the CC decision in Chirwa v Transnet 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) had been 
interpreted to have ‘implicitly’ overruled both Fredericks and Wolfaardt, but Nugent AJA in 
Makhanya ibid at para 14 and 90-93 distinguished Chirwa finding it had not overruled either 
Fredericks or Wolfaardt and similar reasoning was adopted in Gcaba para 53-54. See 
generally Darcy du Toit 'A common-law hydra emerges from the forum shopping swamp' 
(2010) 31 ILJ 21. 
40 Makhanya supra (n35) at para 12. 
41 Ibid para 11. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.   
44 Section 173 of the Constitution.  
45 Makhanya supra (n35) at para 2 and 11.  
46 Ibid para 11.  
47 Ibid para 37, Gcaba supra (n36) at para 52. 
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reason for the interdict, ‘[concerned] the relationship between employer and 
employee’ the LC had jurisdiction to interdict it under s157(2)(a).48 On this 
basis, the court concluded that the LC ‘most likely’ has concurrent jurisdiction 
with the HC to interdict a gathering.49 This discussion on jurisdiction, albeit 
lengthy, is necessary because the LC relied upon them ‘both in relation to 
jurisdiction and the merits.’50  I return to them below where the substantive 
question - whether the LRA limits the constitutional right of employees to 
assemble in compliance with the RGA - is discussed.51  
(ii) Labour Appeal Court  
The LAC similarly held that the LC had jurisdiction but adopted different 
reasoning.52 Relying on s158(1)(a)(iii)53 of the LRA Hlophe AJA reasoned 
where a minority union does not follow the arbitration and conciliation 
procedures s22 prescribes regarding organisational rights disputes, the LC ‘by 
implication of s157(1) read with s158’ has jurisdiction to interdict a gathering.54 
(b) Does the LRA limit the constitutional right of employees to 
assemble and demonstrate under the RGA?  
(i) Labour Court  
Whether the LRA limits the right of employees to assemble under the RGA 
was considered under the head of whether ADT established a clear right to a 
final interdict.55 ADT asserted a clear right on the basis the gathering was 
unlawful.56 This rested on two propositions. First, NASUWU lacked sufficent 
levels of representativeness to validate the organisational rights it wished to 
exercise.57 Second, utilising the RGA as an alternative mechanism to secure 
 
48 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 5.  
49 Ibid para 6. This is consistent with Growthpoint Properties Ltd v SACCAWU 2011 (1) SA 81 
(KZD) para 15 regarding the interdicting of unprotected (or unlawful) picketing conduct in terms 
of s69 of the LRA where the rights of non-employers is concerned. See 2.4(b) of chapter two. 
50 Ibid.  
51 At 4.3(b) below. 
52 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 13. 
53 Section 158(1)(a)(iii) provides the LC can grant ‘an order directing the performance of any 
act, when implemented, will remedy a wrong and give effect to the primary objects of the Act’ 
54 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 13. 
55 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 9.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid para 10-11.  
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organisational rights, would unlawfully circumvent s22 of the LRA.58  
 As to both grounds, Steenkamp J held the starting point to determine 
the lawfulness of the gathering was s17 of the Bill of Rights which is a 
constitutional right employees also enjoy as given effect to by the RGA.59 The 
right asserted by the union was not a ‘LRA right’ but a ‘constitutional right’.60 
Therefore, whether NASUWU had sufficent levels of representativeness to 
validate organisational rights was irrelevant to determining the lawfulness of 
the gathering itself.61 This was because NASUWU’s levels of 
representativeness was a factual question to be determined under s21 of the 
LRA.62 As to the second ground, the LC, in two broad parts, expanded upon 
why the LRA should not be interpreted to limit the right of NASUWU and its 
members to conduct the gathering in compliance with the RGA.   
First, the present matter was distinguishable from ADT Security v 
SATAWU.63 In SATAWU Cele AJ, relying upon TSI Holdings v NUMSA,64 
interdicted a gathering by off-duty employees because their demands solely 
concerned disputes of mutual interest.65 SATAWU was distinguishable for two 
reasons. First, unlike SATAWU, NASUWU expressly disavowed all reliance on 
the LRA.66 Second, as noted, NASUWU and its members made it clear their 
demands were ‘not limited to LRA issues alone’.67 Regardless it is submitted, 
even if SATAWU were applicable, Cele AJ’s reliance upon TSI Holdings was 
misplaced. TSI Holdings did not establish utilising the RGA to make demands 
over disputes of mutual interest is unlawful. Rather, TSI Holdings simply 
establishes unlawful demands cannot form the subject of a protected strike, 
because it would be contrary to the rule of law to protect industrial action which 
 
58 Ibid para 12.  
59 Ibid para 9-10.  
60 Ibid para 11. Adopting similar reasoning per Makhanya supra (n35) para 11 and Gcaba 
supra (n36) para 52 which articulated the first principle: the LRA is not exhaustive of employee 
rights. See 4.3(a)(i) above.   
61 Ibid para 10. 
62 Ibid para 10-11.  
63 (J1099/08) [2008] ZALC 215 (13 June 2008) 
64 2006 (7) BLLR 631 (LAC) para 48.  
65 SATAWU supra (n64) at para 7-8.  
66 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 14-15.  
67 Ibid para 15. See 3.1(bb) of chapter two where I discuss a similar principle regarding strikes 
and demands over mutual interest per the LC decision in  
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has, as its objective, an unlawful demand.68  
Second, and without expressly stating so, Steenkamp J utilised reading 
down to conclude that the LRA and RGA were both capable of an interpretation 
which would both: (a) not result in the LRA limiting the constitutional right of 
off-duty employees assemble under the RGA over workplace disputes; and (b) 
which would not further limit the constitutional right to free assembly than those 
which the RGA already imposes.69 This was for three reasons.  
First, whereas the gathering was arguably ‘contrary to the spirit of the 
LRA insofar as [NASUWU] could have embarked on a protected strike’ that in 
itself did ‘not make it unlawful’.70 As NASUWU expressly disavowed all reliance 
on its right to embark on a protected strike, and fully complied with the RGA, 
the gathering itself was lawful.71 Second, the RGA already limits the right to 
free assembly by requiring convenors to give advance notice of gatherings to 
the authorities in terms of s3(1) and because s11(1) imposes joint and several 
liability for riot damage.72 Both provisions limit the right to free assembly no 
more than is necessary to achieve their purpose.73 Therefore, it would be 
undesirable to limit it further by prohibiting off-duty employees from gathering 
over workplace disputes, to the exclusion of the LRA, in circumstances where 
they expressly disavow all reliance on the LRA.74 Third, ADT had an alternative 
remedy, because s11(1) would allow it to claim damages from NASUWU if any 
riot damage resulted from the gathering and picket.75 
Finally, Steenkamp J similarly rejected the contention the gathering 
should be interdicted because it would breach the implied duty of good faith.76 
The employees would be off-duty during the gathering and participation would 
 
68 TSI Holdings supra (n64) in casu a demand to unfairly dismiss a racist manager in 
contravention of s188 of the LRA. See Halton Cheadle ‘Constitutional and international law’ in 
Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 22-23.  
69 See 2.3(b)(i) where both components of reading down is discussed.  
70 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 15.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid para 15-16. Refer to 3.2(c) of chapter three where both RGA limitations are discussed.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid para 17.  
76 Ibid para 18.  
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therefore not amount to unprotected strike action or a breach of contract.77 If 
on-duty employees participated, they could be disciplined by ADT because 
they would not enjoy the s67 LRA protections applicable to protected strike 
action.78 The right of ADT to discipline such employees therefore provided a 
further alternative remedy.79 An additional alternative remedy was  ADT could 
have judicially reviewed the City’s authorisation in terms s6 of PAJA: an 
alternative remedy it failed to pursue.80 ADT’s interdict application was 
therefore dismissed and the gathering took place as scheduled.81 
(ii) Labour Appeal Court  
The LAC emphasised three propositions in finding the gathering was unlawful 
to conclude - by implication - that the LRA limits the constitutional right of 
employees to assemble under the RGA.  
 First, the LAC emphasised that the LRA was negotiated between 
government, organised labour and business in the National Economic 
Development and Labour Advisory Council (‘NEDLAC’).82 Conversely, the 
RGA is not a product of NEDLAC negotiation.  Therefore the ‘inference is that 
the Legislature could not have intended for the LRA to apply in 
matters…comprehensively dealt with in specialised [labour] legislation’.83  
 Second, the LAC emphasised various conflicts between the provisions 
of the RGA and LRA. For instance: that s64(1)(a) as read with s65(1)(c) of the 
LRA requires that disputes of mutual interest first be referred to the CCMA or 
LC for conciliation or adjudication before protected industrial action can take 
place.84 By contrast, the RGA has no similar requirement of adjudication or 
mandatory conciliation and therefore the RGA, to this extent, conflicts with the 
 
77 Ibid para 15. 
78 Ibid para 18.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid. See Fergus op cit (n10) at 183 and Dennis Davis ‘Assembly’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis 
& NRL Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2018) 12:5 who both 
argue decisions to grant, or refuse, authorisation for a gathering in terms of the RGA 
constitutes administrative action under s1 of PAJA.  
81 Ibid para 19.  
82 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 17 discussed in Fergus op cit (n10) at 183.  
83 ADT Security ibid relying on Sidumo v Rustenburg Mines 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) para 94.  
84 ADT Security ibid para 14.  
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LRA.85 Section 210 of the LRA therefore requires its provisions supersede the 
RGA insofar as a conflict arises between the two statutes.86 
 Third, and connected to the preceding two propositions, the LAC relied 
upon several decisions such as Gcaba,87 Sidumo v Rustenburg Mines,88 
SANDU v Minister of Defence89 and SATAWU90 in emphasising the LRA’s 
central object of creating specialised forums and procedures to regulate 
employment related disputes.91 By utilising the RGA, and not the LRA, the LAC 
reasoned that permitting the gathering in the circumstances would undermine 
the principle of subsidiarity because it would create parallel systems of 
jurisprudence under different statutes.92 Thus, it would be contrary to public 
policy to permit unions to ‘bypass’ the LRA’s dispute resolution mechanisms 
by using the RGA in the present circumstances.93 However, and despite this, 
the LAC gave, unlike the LC, relatively little consideration to the fact NASUWU 
expressly disavowed all reliance on its rights under the LRA and relied solely 
on its constitutional right to assemble in accordance with the RGA.94 
 The LAC declined to decide whether employee participation would 
breach the implied contractual duty of good faith. However, it did appear 
inclined towards such a finding by remarking, ‘there can be no doubt that 
picketing at an employers head office during their lunch break would impact 
on the employer’s goodwill and reputation’.95  
 
 
85 Ibid para 14-16. Section 210 of the LRA states insofar as a conflict arises between the 
provisions of the LRA and any Act expressly amending the LRA or the Constitution, the LRA 
must prevail.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Gcaba supra (n36) at para 56. 
88 Sidumo supra (n83) 
89 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) para 51.  
90 Supra (n63).  
91 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 17-21 and para 30.  
92 Ibid para 30 referring to Gcaba supra (n36) at para 56. However, the LAC failed to take 
cognisance of para 54 of Gcaba where the CC also held, ‘legislation must not be interpreted 
to exclude or unduly limit remedies for the enforcement of constitutional rights’. See Fergus 
op cit (n10) at 183 for a further criticism on why the LAC’s reliance on Gcaba was misplaced.  
93 ADT Security Ibid para 32.  
94 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 12 and 14.  
95 ADT Security supra (n2) at para 31.  
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4.4. THREE CRITICISIMS OF ADT SECURITY  
(a) First criticism: failure to consider ‘reading down’  
As discussed elsewhere,96 ‘reading down’ has two interconnected principles 
courts must always apply even where litigants do not expressly invoke it.97 
First, legislation must always be interpreted in a manner which does not limit 
a fundamental right where it is ‘reasonably possible’ to do so.98 Second, where 
legislation does limit a fundamental right, it must be narrowly construed to 
ensure it limits the right no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose.99 
 While the LC applied reading down in both senses, the LAC appears to 
have completely disregarded it. However, unlike the LAC, the LC gave no 
consideration to s210 of the LRA. Section 210, among other propositions,100 
significantly influenced the LAC’s conclusion that the gathering would be 
unlawful - given that the LRA provides for mandatory dispute resolution over 
mutual interest disputes, prior to the exercise of economic pressure, while the 
RGA does not.101 Thus, the issue is whether s210 is reasonably capable of an 
interpretation that would permit off-duty employees to utilise the RGA as an 
alternative to the LRA where they expressly disavow all reliance on the LRA?  
 It is submitted two possibilities exist. First, similar to protest action under 
s77, where employees disavow reliance on the LRA, the gathering should be 
permitted if it involves both workplace demands, and other demands not 
regulated by the LRA.102 This was the case in ADT Security, where NASUWU 
made it clear their demands were ‘not limited to LRA issues alone’.103 Second, 
where off-duty employees expressly disavow all reliance on the LRA, s210 is 
not applicable as the employees in question would have disavowed all reliance 
upon it.104 However, whether s210 is ‘reasonably capable’ of either 
 
96 See 2.3(b)(i) of chapter two.  
97 See Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Grundlingh 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC) para 26-27. 
98 Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) para 89. 
99 TAWUSA obo Ngedle v Unitrans Fuel (Pty) Ltd 2016 (37) ILJ 2485 (CC) para 52-53. 
100 See the other two propositions the LAC relied upon at 4.3(b)(ii) above.  
101See Fergus op cit (n10) at 183-184.  
102 See the discussion at 3.1(c) of chapter three.  
103 ADT Security supra (n1) at para 15. What the ‘other issues’ entailed however is not made 
clear in either judgment.  
104 This appeared to be the reasoning of the LC ibid at para 14-15.  
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interpretation is less certain, given the courts have consistently asserted the 
primacy of the LRA over other legislation under s210.105 It is undeniable, 
insofar as employment disputes are concerned, that the RGA conflicts with the 
LRA to the extent the former does not require referrals to conciliation before a 
RGA protest over a workplace dispute can take place. It is therefore doubtful, 
despite what the LC found, that s210 is reasonably capable of an interpretation 
which would not limit the right to utilise the RGA, without first relying upon the 
LRA, as a mechanism to influence the outcome of an employment dispute.   
(b) Second criticism: ADT Security conflicts with SATAWU v Garvis  
Fergus106 contends ADT Security conflicts with the CC’s judgment in SATAWU 
v Garvis.107 As discussed, Garvis involved a gathering in the City of Cape 
Town, undertaken in conjunction with a protected strike, which resulted in 
millions rands worth of riot damage.108 In Garvis, the CC did not directly 
address if the gathering itself was unlawful, as the Court was confined to 
determining the constitutionality of s11(2) of the RGA.109 However, the CC did 
not find the gathering unlawfully circumvented the LRA.110 Therefore, on this 
basis, Fergus contends the CC ‘implicitly accepted’ its legality, hence raising 
the possibility that ADT Security conflicts with the CC’s decision in Garvis.111 
 However, Garvis is distinguishable from ADT Security. In Garvis, it was 
common cause the union had already utilised the LRA’s dispute resolution 
procedures as the strike was protected.112 Garvis however, does arguably 
establish that unions can utilise RGA gatherings in conjunction with protected 
strike action to influence the outcome of workplace disputes of mutual interest. 
Where a gathering is undertaken in conjunction with a protected strike, the 
basis on which the LAC in ADT Security held the gathering to be unlawful 
would fall away. Specifically, a gathering in these circumstances would only 
occur once the dispute of mutual interest had been conciliated, given 
 
105 See Sidumo supra (n83) at para 99 and Chirwa supra (n39) at para 49.   
106 Fergus op cit (n10) at 184.  
107 Supra (n12).  
108 See 3.2(c)(ii) of chapter three.  
109 Garvis supra (n12) at para 4.  
110 Fergus op cit (n10) at 184.  
111 Ibid.  
112 Garvis supra (n12) at para 10.  
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conciliation is, generally speaking, a pre-requisite for protected strike action.113 
Furthermore, as Du Toit notes, nothing prevents supporters or family members 
of a union from utilising the RGA to stage demonstrations, gatherings or 
pickets in support of that union’s workplace demands.114 
(c) Third criticism: ADT Security is incompatible the constitutional 
right of trade unions to engage in collective bargaining 
Cheadle contends ADT Security is incompatible with the constitutional right of 
trade unions to engage in collective bargaining.115 This right has three 
components.116 First, the negative aspect of the right entails a ‘freedom to 
collectively bargain’ which means any law that prohibits or restricts the ability 
to collectively bargain will limit it.117 Second, there is an ‘implicit right’ to 
exercise economic power, for example, through strike action.118 Third, and 
most controversially, a positive duty to bargain.119 
 For present purposes, only the second component, the implicit right to 
exercise economic power, is relevant. In In re: Certification of the Constitution 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the CC in affirming 
this second component, held the ‘primary mechanism’ through which workers 
exercise economic power is through strike action.120 Employers exercise 
economic power through a ‘range of weapons’ such as, ‘the employment of 
alternative or replacement labour, the unilateral imposition of new terms and 
conditions of employment’ and ‘lock-outs’.121 On this basis, the CC appears to 
have accepted the right to exercise economic power is not confined to strike 
action but could also hypothetically include other mechanisms, such as, for 
 
113 See Bradley Conradie ‘Protected Strikes’ in Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the Law (2017) 
64.  
114 Du Toit op cit (n8) at 22. 
115 Cheadle op cit (n8). A similar argument is made by Malcom Wallis ‘Now You Foresee It, 
Now You Don’t – SATAWU v Garvis & Others’ (2012) 33 ILJ 2261-2262.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid 24:1.  
118 Ibid 24:2.  
119 Ibid. However, this part of the right only exists in principle as the CC in SANDU supra (n89) 
at para 48 declined to decide whether the right has a positive duty to bargain thereby leaving 
the SCA decision in SANDU v Minister of Defence 2007 (1) SA 402 (SCA) para 25, that there 
is no constitutional duty to bargain, intact.  
120 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 66 
121 Ibid.  
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instance, RGA protests.122 Thus, on this basis, an argument exists that unions 
have a constitutional right, pursuant to the implicit right to exercise economic 
power during collective bargaining, to utilise the RGA, without relying upon the 
LRA, as a mechanism to influence workplace disputes, hence raising further 
doubts about the correctness of the LAC’s conclusion in ADT Security.123  
4.5. CONCLUSION  
Despite criticisms, the LAC in ADT Security clearly established that the LRA 
limits the constitutional right of employees to assemble under the RGA over a 
dispute of mutual interest. Whether this limitation passes constitutional muster, 
in terms of s36 of the Constitution, is considered in the next chapter.  
 
122 Cheadle op cit (n8) at 18:24. However, as Brassey Commentary on the Labour Relations 
Act (2006) C3:55-C3:56 appears to suggest, if this holds then it could equally follow, and 
despite the fact the right to lock-out is not expressly protected in s23, that employers have a 
corresponding right to a lock-out as part of the implicit right to exercise economic power.  
123 Cheadle Ibid referring to NUPSAW obo Mani v National Lotteries Board 2014 (35) ILJ 1885 
(CC) para 35-36 where the CC appeared to accept that a media campaign, pursuant to a 




THE LIMITATION ANALYSIS: CAN EITHER LIMITATION BE 
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LIMITATION CLAUSE?  
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
The preceding two chapters established two restrictions the LRA imposes on 
the constitutional right of employees to free assembly. First, how its definition 
of protest action prohibits - or least cannot protect - purely political protest 
action by workers under s77 of the LRA which correspondingly limits their 
constitutional right to assemble and demonstrate. Second, how s210 prohibits 
off-duty employees from exercising the constitutional right to protest in 
compliance with the RGA to influence the outcome of collective bargaining 
without first utilising the LRA. In three parts, this chapter considers if either 
limitation is justifiable according to the criteria in s36(1) of the Constitution.  
First, I explain proportionality and the role it plays in determining the 
justifiability of a limitation, together with the variable standard of justification it 
attracts. Second, I explain the various factors s36(1)(a)-(e) requires one to 
consider when determining the justifiability of a limitation. Additional factors, 
not expressly mentioned in s36(1)(a)-(e), are also considered given, as noted 
elsewhere, the s36(1)(a)-(e) factors do not constitute a closed list.1 Third, I 
apply s36(1) to both limitations and contend, in conclusion, that neither are 
justifiable and thus stand to be declared unconstitutional in terms of s172(1)(a) 
of the Constitution.2 Two recommendations to address the unconstitutionality 
of the LRA on this score are set out in the following chapter. 
5.2. ‘REASONABLE AND JUSTIFIABLE’: PROPORTIONALITY AND 
THE VARIABLE STANDARD OF JUSTIFICATION   
Section 36(1) of the Constitution states:  
‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may only be limited in terms of a law of general 
 
1 See 2.2(b) of chapter two and Law Society v Minister of Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) 
para 37. 
2 See Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 para 59 on what s172(1)(a) requires 
where an unjustifiable limitation is established, discussed at 2.2 of chapter two.   
58 
 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors including –  
(a) the nature of the right,  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation,  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation, 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’3  
 Neither s36(1), or its predecessor in s33 of the interim Constitution,4 
require, at least not expressly, that a limitation be ‘proportional’ in order to be 
‘reasonable and justifiable’.5 However, since the CC’s first decision,6 it has 
interpreted ‘reasonable and justifiable’ to require that a limitation be 
proportional (sometimes referred to as ‘balanced’)7 to be constitutional.8 
Section 36(1) therefore cannot be meaningfully applied without properly 
understanding how the proportionality requirement influences its practical 
application.9 Proportionality, it is submitted, has two broad elements. First, a 
threshold requirement, requires that the limitation occur for reasons which a 
 
3 Emphasis added.  See 2.2(b) of chapter two where I discuss the threshold requirements of 
(a) law of general application; and (b) rationality. The CC has consistently accepted the LRA 
is a ‘law of general application’ and therefore, it is unnecessary to consider it further. Rationality 
is considered in more detail below at 5.3(d).   
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
5 Pierre de Vos ‘The Limitation of Rights’ in Pierre De Vos & Warren Freedman (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law in Context (2013) 363 
6 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 104 where Chaskalson P held ‘the limitation 
of rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in an open and democratic society 
involves the weighing up of competiting values, and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality’ (emphasis added). Whilst the Makwanyane account on proportionality was 
decided under s33 of the interim Constitution, it equally holds for s36 of the Final Constitution. 
See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) para 33-35.  
7 See Iain Currie ‘Balancing and the Limitation of Rights in the South African Constitution’ in 
Stuart Woolman & David Blitchitz (eds) Is this Seat Taken? Conversations at the Bar, Bench 
and Academy about the South African Constitution (2012) 251. 
8 See Iain Currie & Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 162-163 and De 
Vos op cit (n5). The CC’s endorsement of proportionality is perhaps unsurprising given its use 
in Canadian constitutional law as the limitation clause is largely modelled on a comparable 
provision in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Hugh Corder & Lourens Du 
Plessis Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 127-128 and R v Oakes 
(1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 at 277. 
9 See IM Rautenbach ‘Proportionality and the Limitation Clauses of the South African Bill of 
Rights’ (2014) 17 PELJ 2250 for a comprehensive discussion on proportionality.   
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reasonable person, committed to a society based on ‘human dignity, equality 
and freedom’, would regard as sufficiently persuasive to justify the limitation of 
a fundamental right.10 Second, a balance must be struck between any harm 
the limitation causes (‘infringement of a fundamental right’) and any 
corresponding benefits it seeks to achieve (‘the purpose of the limitation’).11  
 In this sense, all relevant factors, including those expressly mentioned 
in s36(1)(a)-(e) must be considered to determine whether a limitation satisfies 
these twin elements of proportionality.12 As noted, no single factor should be 
elevated above another.13 Neither should they be applied ‘mechanically’ as a 
‘checklist of requirements’.14 Furthermore, no universal standard exists to 
determine proportionality, as each limitation must be scrutinised according to 
the facts and circumstances of each case.15 However, what is clear, is the 
standard of justification proportionality attracts is subject to a sliding scale.16 In 
other words, the persuasiveness of the reasons required to satisfy 
proportionality can be heightened depending on factors such as: (a) whether 
the limitation infringes multiple constitutional rights;17 (b) the extent of the 
infringement;18 (c) its relative importance;19 (d) whether less restrictive means 
to achieve the purpose of the limitation exist;20 and (e) which right is infringed.21 
 
10 Denise Meyerson Rights Limited (1997) 36-43 cited in Currie & De Waal op cit (n8) at 151. 
This essentially constitutes the threshold requirement of rationality, considered at 5.3(b) and 
(d) below. See 2.2(b) of chapter 2 where I explain what rationality entails.  
11 Currie & De Waal ibid at 162-163. See a similar summary of this second element in S v 
Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para 18 and Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters 
2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) para 27.  
12 See Currie & De Waal bid at 164 and Walters ibid at para 26-27. 
13 See S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 32 and 2.2(b) of chapter two.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Makwanyane supra (n6).  
16 See Halton Cheadle ‘Limitations’ in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom South African 
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2018) 30:10-30-11 and Rautenbach op cit (n9).  
17 See Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 46 and 82. 
18 See Bhulwana supra (n11) where the CC remarked that ‘…the more substantial the inroad 
into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the ground of justification must be’. See also S v 
Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) para 86. 
19 Magajane v Chairperson North West Gambling Board 2006 (5) SA 250 (CC) para 65. 
20 See Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 49 and the minority 
judgment in Prince v President Cape Law Society 2001 (2) SA 388 (CC) para 83.  
21 The question of a ‘hierarchy of rights’ is controversial, as noted by De Vos op cit (n5) at 374. 
In Johncom Media Investments Limited v M 2009 (4) SA 7 (CC) para 19 the CC held there 
exists no hierarchy. However, in other decisions such as Makwanyane supra (n6) at para 34 
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 Factors (b), (c) and (d) also constitute factors s36(1) requires one to 
consider to determine the justifiability of a limitation.22 In this sense, it is 
submitted these factors operate on two levels. First, they are relevant to 
determine if a limitation is ‘reasonable and justifiable’. Second, they influence 
the level of scrutiny (or standard of justification) which a limitation will be 
subjected to determine its justifiability.23 I explain this interaction below, where 
I also simultaneously apply s36(1) to both limitations in illustrating how both 
unjustifiably limit the constitutional right of workers to freedom of assembly.  
5.3. THE LIMITATION ANALYSIS  
(a) Nature (and importance) of the right  
This requires considering two things. First, whether the limitation is compatible 
with the essential content of the right.24 Second, the relative importance of the 
right to an ‘open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom’.25 Generally, the more important the right to an open and democratic 
society, the more persuasive the standard of justification will be.26 
 The CC has consistently underscored the importance of freedom of 
assembly to an open and democratic society in several decisions.27 The Court 
has also drawn express connections between free assembly and constitutional 
 
it held ‘the rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights’ and similar 
comments were expressed about equality in Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 
(CC) para 71. See Cheadle op cit (n16) who argues proportionality necessarily requires that 
there exist a hierarchy of constitutional rights. 
22 The above factors do not constitute a closed list and other considerations may heighten (or 
potentially decrease) the standard of justification. See De Vos ibid at 373-378.  
23 See Stuart Woolman & Henk Botha ‘Limitations’ in Stuart Woolman & Michael Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2013) 34:67-34:70, Cheadle op cit (n16) and Kevin 
Iles ‘A Fresh Look at Limitations: Unpacking Section 36’ (2007) 28 SAJHR 80-84.  
24 There is some controversy whether this is necessarily a factor which must be considered. 
While it expressly appeared in s33(1)(b) of the interim Constitution, it does not expressly 
appear in s36(1) of the Final Constitution. Contrast Cheadle op cit (n16) at 30:1 with Stuart 
Woolman & Henk Botha ibid 34:71-34:72 regarding different views on this factor. 
25 While the ‘importance of the right’ does not appear in s36(1), it was referred to in 
Makwanyane supra (n6) under the interim constitution. In National Coalition supra (n6) at para 
34, under the final Constitution, Ackermann J held the importance of the right is a factor ‘which 
must necessarily be taken into account’. See SATAWU v Garvis 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC) para 61 
where the importance of the right to free assembly was considered under this factor.  
26 Woolman & Botha op cit (n23) at 34:71.  
27 Garvis supra (n25), Mlungwana v S 2019 (1) BCLR 88 (CC) para 73.  
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rights to free expression, association, political rights and dignity.28 In doing so, 
it has also expressly affirmed links between free assembly and participatory 
democracy.29 For economically vulnerable groups, such as workers, freedom 
of assembly is an indispensable mechanism for them to articulate their views 
and canvass support for causes of importance to them.30 Additionally relevant 
is that the courts have also consistently emphasised the suppression of free 
assembly in the past in underlining its importance in democratic South Africa.31  
Taking these factors into account, two things become clear. First, 
freedom of assembly is regarded as an indispensable component of 
participatory democracy in a society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.32 Second, any limitation of the right to free assembly will, almost 
invariably, also indirectly infringe other constitutional rights.33 Therefore, given 
its importance, and its intrinsic connection to other constitutional rights, a high 
standard of justification would have to be met to justify limiting its exercise.34 
(b) Importance and purpose of the limitations 
This factor has two elements.35 First, identifying the limitations purpose.36 
Second, examining the relative importance of that purpose in an open and 
democratic society.37 This overlaps with the rationality threshold requirement, 
because any limitation which serves no legitimate constitutional purpose, or 
bears no rational connection to a legitimate purpose, cannot ever be 
 
28 See SANDU v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) para 8, S v Mamabolo 2001 3) SA 
409 (CC) para 50. See also Business SA v COSATU 1997 (5) BLLR 511 (LAC) a 499D-E 
discussed in Rehana Cassim ‘The Legal Status of Political Protest Action’ (2008) 29 ILJ 2371.  
29 Mlungwana supra (n27) at para 69 referring to Doctors for Life International v Speaker of 
the National Assembly 2006 (6) A 416 (CC) para 115.  
30 See Henk Botha ‘Fundamental Rights and Democratic Contestation: Reflections on 
Freedom of Assembly in an Unequal Society’ (2017) 21 LDD 1221 
31 See Garvis supra (n25) and Mlungwana ibid para 66 referring to Sachs v Minister of Justice 
1934 AD 11. 
32Mlungwana supra ibid at para 69.    
33 Ibid at para 71. Namely, rights to free expression, association and inherent human dignity. 
34 Garvis op cit (n25) at para 66, Business SA supra (n28). See also Cassim op cit (n28) at 
2372 and 5.2 above.  
35 Woolman & Botha op cit (n23) at 34:73.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, Cheadle op cit (n16) at 30:15-30:16.  
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justifiable.38 One obvious problem is that the purpose of a limitation is not 
always immediately apparent.39 Therefore, one must interpret the limiting law 
to ascertain its purpose, and then determine if that purpose is both legitimate 
and sufficiently compelling to justify the limitation of that fundamental right.40  
 The LRA does not state the purpose of either limitation. However, it is 
submitted, their respective purposes are as follows. The prohibition on purely 
political protest action arguably has two purposes. First, to prevent the 
economic harm wide scale protest action over a purely political matter would  
cause because it would necessarily entail substantial numbers of employees 
not reporting for work.41 Second, as noted previously,42 because purely 
political protest action is viewed as ‘disruptive of the democratic process’.43 
Similarly, prohibiting off-duty employees from gathering over disputes of 
mutual interest, without utilising the LRA, also has a similar two-fold purpose. 
First, to strive, as far as possible, that workplace disputes can be resolved 
through conciliation or arbitration without a resort to industrial action.44 Second, 
to ensure the LRA’s purpose, as the central statute giving effect to the labour 
rights in s23 of the Constitution, is not undermined.45  
Both limitations strive to achieve legitimate purposes and a rational 
connection exists between the limitations and the purposes they respectively 
seek to achieve. However, there are several counterarguments that these 
 
38 See Currie & De Waal op cit (n8) at 166, Cheadle op cit (n16) at 30:10-30:13 and Illes op 
cit (n23) at 82-83. De Vos op cit (n21) at 371 therefore regards this factor is a threshold 
requirement, not a balancing factor in terms of proportionality.   
39 Woolman & Botha ibid at 34:73. 
40 Cheadle op cit (n16) referring to National Coalition supra (n6) at para 37-38. See also 
Makwanyane supra (n6) at para 185.   
41 Cassim op cit (n28) referring to the majority decision in Business SA supra (n28) at 481E-F 
and the IC decision in ACTWUSA v African Hide Trading 1989 (10) ILJ 475 (IC) at 478J-479A.  
42 See 3.1(c)(ii) of chapter three where the ILO CFA position on purely political protest action 
is discussed.  
43 Tania Novitz International and European Protection of the Right to Strike (2003) 295. 
44 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act (1995) 16 ILJ 284 and Darcy du 
Toit, Shane Godfrey & Carole Cooper et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 6 
ed (2014) 333.  
45 Section 1(a) of the LRA provides its fundamental purpose is ‘to advance economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace [by] giving 
effect to the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996’.  
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purposes, whilst rational and legitimate, are not sufficiently compelling to justify 
infringing the constitutional right of workers to freedom of assembly. 
Two counterarguments exist regarding the prohibition on purely political 
protest action. First, it is undisputable purely political protests cause economic 
harm. However, strike action equally causes economic harm.46 In essence, the 
right to strike is a ‘right to cause to economic harm’.47 Second, and while 
economic harm remains a relevant consideration,48 prohibiting workers from 
protesting over political issues undermines fundamental values of participatory 
democracy and the ability of workers - as vulnerable members of society - to 
meaningfully influence the democratic process.49 Purely political protests can 
therefore serve to enhance the democracy process, not disrupt it.50    
Three counterarguments similarly exist regarding the prohibition on 
RGA gatherings. First, it is undeniable that permitting off-duty employees to 
utilise the RGA as an alternative mechanism to influence collective bargaining 
would undermine the LRA’s dispute resolution mechanisms. However, as 
argued in the previous chapter, RGA gatherings can equally be considered as 
a facet of the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining.51 Second, 
only off-duty employees would be permitted to use the RGA in these 
circumstances, in turn minimising economic harm as such workers would not 
be on duty. Third, it is debatable whether permitting such gatherings would 
result in a parallel stream of jurisprudence under the RGA. Workers would 
receive none of the civil immunities against civil legal proceedings applicable 
to protected strikes and would continuously face the possibility of joint and 
several liability for riot damage if the gathering turned awry. It is thus unlikely 
unions would elect to follow this route on a widespread basis in practice.   
 
46 See the minority judgment of Nicholson JA in Business SA supra (n28) at 496A and the IC 
decision in Gana v Building Materials Manufacturers t/a Doorcor (1990) 11 ILJ 564 (IC) at 
574D both discussed in Cassim op cit (n28) at 2373-2374.  
47 See Bob Hepple ‘The Freedom to Strike and its Rationale’ in Bob Hepple, Rochelle Le Roux 
& Silvana Sciarra (eds) Laws Against Strikes: The South African Experience in an International 
and Comparative Perspective (2016) 12.  
48 Cassim op cit (n28) at 2374.  
49 See Botha op cit (n30), Mlungwana supra (n27). 
50 Novitz op cit (n43) at 260.  
51 See 4.4(c) of chapter four.  
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(c) Nature and extent of the limitations  
This requires considering the degree of the infringement.52 Limitations which 
substantially impact on fundamental rights,53 or affect the dignity of vulnerable  
groups in particular, attract a greater standard of justification.54 
 The prohibition on purely political protest action severely impacts upon 
the ability of workers, as a vulnerable group, to exercise fundamental rights to 
freedom of assembly, expression and association. Similarly, it impacts upon 
their ability to influence the outcome of the democratic process. Taken 
together, it impacts their fundamental dignity as a vulnerable group and would 
therefore attract a high standard of justification. Conversely however, it must 
be accepted workers would still be able to organise protests over purely 
political matters in terms of the RGA. However, on the opposite side of the 
coin, such protest action could only occur outside of working hours which could 
fundamentally impact upon its efficacy.  
 Equally, the prohibition on RGA gatherings also affects the ability of 
workers to demonstrate and assemble where the underlying dispute is one of 
mutual interest regulated by the LRA. However, one consideration pulls in the 
opposite direction. Specifically, because  workers would be able to utilise RGA 
gatherings in conjunction with protected strike action.55 This consideration 
would weigh in favour of a finding of proportionality and justifiability, because 
the impact upon the right is minimised, provided workers first follow the LRA’s 
dispute resolution procedures that regulate disputes of mutual interest. 
(d) Relation between the limitations and their purpose  
This factor requires considering two things. First, the extent to which the 
limitation is capable of achieving its purpose.56 Second, whether a proportional 
 
52 Currie & de Waal op cit (n8) at 168, Cheadle op cit (n16) at 30:16.  
53 Manamela supra (n13). 
54 Mlungwana supra (n27) at para 82 referring to Jaftha v Schoeman 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) 
para 39 and 43 and Sarrahwitz v Maritz NO 2015 (4) SA 491 (CC) para 46 and 63. 
55 See 4.4(b) of chapter four.  
56 Woolman & Botha op cit (n23) at 34:83, Cheadle op cit (n16) at 30:16. However, as De Vos 
op cit (n5) at 371 notes, this factor overlaps with the rationality requirement as, even where a 
limitation serves a legitimate purpose, it cannot be justifiable if there exists no possibility that 
it will achieve its purpose. See for instance Bhulwana supra (n11) at para 20-23.  
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balance is struck between the means chosen to achieve the purpose of the 
limitation and any corresponding impact on the constitutional right.57 If the 
means chosen only marginally contribute towards its achievement, it is less 
likely to be reasonable and justifiable.58 
 It is submitted exist clear arguments exist both for, and against, the 
proposition both limitations are capable of achieving their purpose. First, there 
does exist a reasonable possibility that prohibiting purely political protests will 
prevent economic harm. However, as above, this argument is substantially 
weakened when one considers that strike action equally causes economic 
harm. It is weakened further when one also considers the corresponding 
indirect impact the prohibition has on other constitutional rights such as dignity, 
association and free expression. Second, prohibiting off-duty employees from 
using the RGA as an alternative mechanism outside the LRA to engage in 
collective bargaining, also has a reasonable possibility of preventing 
unnecessary industrial action and parallel streams of jurisprudence. However, 
this argument is similarly weakened when one considers that unions and 
workers are unlikely to use RGA protests in this manner on a widespread 
basis, given that gatherings, unlike protected strikes, attract no immunity 
against civil legal proceedings or dismissal and will always face the possibility 
of strict joint and several liability for riot damage under s11(1)(a) of the RGA. 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve each purpose  
This requires examining if the purpose of the limitation can be achieved by 
means that are less restrictive of the right.59 Where less restrictive means exist 
to achieve the purpose of a limitation, it is less likely to be justifiable.60 While 
all relevant factors must be considered, this is the factor on ‘which most 
limitations will stand or fall’.61 However, a degree of judicial deference is 
necessary because it is always possible for the courts to identify hypothetically 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose of a given limitation.62 
 
57 Currie & De Waal op cit (n7) at 169.  
58 Ibid, Cheadle op cit (n16) at 30:16.  
59 Cheadle ibid at 30:15-30:16.  
60 Currie & de Waal op cit (n7) at 170.  
61 Ibid at 171.  
62 See Makwanyane supra (n6) at para 107 and Manamela supra (n13) at para 94.  
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 Considering appropriate deference, it is submitted there exist means to 
achieve the purpose of each limitation which are not only less restrictive of the 
right to freedom of assembly, but which will also give effect to their purposes.  
First, regarding purely political protests, there is no reason why purely 
such protest action could not be permitted, but subjected to stricter scrutiny 
than protest action not concerning purely political matters. This is the approach 
followed in other ‘open and democratic societies’63 such as Italy and Denmark 
which permit purely political protest provided they are of short duration.64 Not 
only would this be less restrictive of the right but would equally prevent the 
indirect infringement of other rights such as expression, association and 
dignity. Furthermore, it would also promote participatory democracy by 
allowing workers to meaningfully influence the outcome of political decisions. 
 Second, regarding the prohibition on RGA gatherings, a less restrictive 
measure would be to only permit gatherings were workers expressly disavow 
reliance on the LRA. Furthermore, a relevant consideration, is on-duty workers 
who engage in gatherings could be disciplined by their employer and that their 
employer could judicially review authorisations for gatherings under s6 of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.65 If riot damage occurs, as the LC in 
ADT Security found, the employer would have another additional remedy by 
holding the union jointly and severally liable under s11(1) of the RGA.66  
5.4. CONCLUSION 
It is submitted two conclusions flow from the above. First, given both limitations 
limit rights which are fundamental to an open democratic society, affect the 
dignity of vulnerable groups and infringe multiple constitutional rights, they 
would be subjected to a strict or high standard of justification. Second, neither 
limitation meets the requirements of ‘reasonableness and justifiability’ 
 
63 Examining the position of other ‘open and democratic societies’ is a relevant factor not 
expressly mentioned in s36(1) to determine the justifiability of a limitation. See for instance 
National Coalition supra (n6) where Ackermann J examined the position of other open and 
democratic societies in determining whether the criminalisation of sodomy unjustifiably limited 
the right of homosexuals to equality.   
64 See Cassim op cit (n28) at 2360 and the discussion of the Italian Constitutional Court 
decision in Public Prosecutor v Antenaci vol 1 ILLR 51.  
65 Act 3 of 2000. See the discussion at 4.3(b)(i) of chapter four.  
66 ADT Security (Pty) Ltd v NASUWU 2012 (33) ILJ 575 (LC) para 10.  
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prescribed by s36(1) of the Constitution as: the connections between the 
limitations and their purposes are weak; means less restrictive of the right to 
freedom of assembly, which will equally achieve the purposes of both 
limitations exist; and because the purposes they seek to achieve, whilst 
legitimate, are not sufficiently persuasive to justify the severe infringements 
they impose on the right of workers to free assembly. I now turn to consider 
two amendments to the LRA which could potentially remedy its unjustifiable 






















CHAPTER SIX  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
Modern labour law, at least in capitalist societies,1 is underpinned by the 
proposition that there exists an ‘inherent inequality of bargaining power 
between employer and employee’.2 This proposition in mind, I have sought to 
advance two central claims. First, the constitutional right to freedom of 
assembly has the potential to provide workers with an additional mechanism 
to counteract this inequality, in addition to the fundamental right to strike. 
Second, workers do not exist solely as employees, but equally as citizens. The 
right to free assembly provides them, as vulnerable members of society, with 
an indispensable mechanism to meaningfully participate (and influence) the 
outcome of the democratic process. In turn, this not only gives effect to other 
fundamental constitutional rights such as association, expression and dignity, 
but equally enhances the value of participatory democracy.  
 Advancing both claims, I have attempted to establish how the LRA 
unjustifiably limits the constitutional right of workers to free assembly in both 
senses. First, how s210 unjustifiably limits their constitutional right to assemble 
in terms the RGA by prohibiting them from utilising it as an alternative 
mechanism, outside the LRA, to influence the outcome of workplace disputes 
of mutual interest. Second, how the statutory definition of protest action, in 
s213 of the LRA, prohibits them from embarking on protected protest action 
under s77 of the LRA over purely political matters which do not necessarily 
affect their socio-economic interests. Comprehensive recommendations to 
address the unconstitutionality of the LRA on this score is beyond the scope 
of this work. Two recommendations, albeit briefly articulated, would however, 
it is submitted, address both unjustifiable (and unconstitutional) infringements.  
 First, the definition of protest action in s213 of the LRA should be 
amended by deleting the reference to ‘socio-economic interests of workers’. 
 
1 Halton Cheadle ‘Constitutional and international law’ in Darcy du Toit (ed) Strikes and the 
Law (2017) 5. 
2 Paul Davis & Mark Freedland Khan Freund’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) 6 endorsed in 
Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) para 72.  
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This would provide sufficent scope for workers to embark on protected protest 
action under s77 of the LRA over a purely political issue. However, purely 
political protest action should not be unlimited, either in scope or duration. A 
similar amendment to s77 of the LRA should be considered which would give 
the LC the power, which it already has, to grant a declaratory order expressly 
limiting the scope and duration of purely political protest action. A 
proportionality enquiry should conducted, similar to the one it already 
conducts, to determine the length and duration of a purely political protest and 
all relevant factors should be considered in determining the duration of the 
protest action, including those already referred to in s77(2)(b) as well as the 
importance of the matter giving rise to the political protest action. 
 Second, s210 of the LRA should be amended to expressly permit 
workers to assemble, in compliance with the RGA, over a workplace dispute 
the LRA regulates. However, this should be confined solely to permitting off-
duty workers to protest under the RGA over a dispute of mutual interest without 
relying upon the LRA. Additionally, workers should only be permitted to utilise 
this route where they expressly disavow all reliance on the LRA. In this sense, 
once workers elect to utilise the RGA, and disavow reliance on the LRA, they 
should not be permitted to subsequently refer a dispute of mutual interest and 
embark on protected strike action over it. This is not to suggest, as is the 
current position, that workers should not be able to use RGA demonstrations 
and gatherings in conjunction with protected strike action in terms of chapter 
IV of the LRA. Rather, if workers elect to pursue an RGA assembly, to the 
exclusion of the LRA, they should be bound by that decision and not be entitled 
to subsequently to engage in forum shopping should the RGA demonstration 
not be successful in compelling their employer to accede their demand. This 
suggestion, it is submitted, would not only allow workers to utilise the RGA as 
an alternative mechanism to engage in collective bargaining, but would also 
equally prevent the development of parallel and potentially conflicting streams 
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